STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF MOBILIZATION MESSAGES IN A STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: APPLYING THE RECEIVE-ACCEPT-SAMPLE (RAS) MODEL by Lenoir, Brandon W.
 STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF MOBILIZATION MESSAGES IN A 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: APPLYING THE RECEIVE-ACCEPT-
SAMPLE (RAS) MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Brandon W. Lenoir 
B.S. in Business Management, Idaho State University, 1997 
M.S. in Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
PhD in Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
2013 
 
 ii 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
by 
 
 
Brandon W. Lenoir 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
December 3, 2013 
and approved by 
Jon Hurwitz, PhD, Professor 
Chris Bonneau, PhD, Associate Professor 
John Duffy, PhD, Professor 
 Dissertation Director: David Barker, PhD, Professor 
 
 
 iii 
Copyright © by Brandon W. Lenoir 
2013 
 iv 
 
The study of mobilization has presented scholars with an interesting puzzle as we attempt to 
identify who is responsive to mobilization messages.  The framing of the debate by Kenneth M. 
Goldstein and Matthew Holleque (2010) pits competing theoretical arguments against one 
another without a satisfying conclusion.  Some argue it is the least informed segments of the 
population who will be responsive (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), while others posit it is 
those with high levels of political information and past involvement (e.g., Hillygus 2005).  In this 
dissertation I present a third explanation that may provide a better framework for studying the 
debate.  Applying John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model to the study of 
mobilization, I find not only do individuals with moderate levels of past voting behavior respond 
to mobilization messages, but so do those with high and low levels.  The key to the RAS model 
is exposure to the message.  Thus understanding who is most likely to receive a mobilization 
message is central to this project.  
 I conducted field experiments during a magisterial judicial election in a major U.S. city to 
collect my data.  The purpose of those experiments was to capture the effects of mobilization 
messages on an individual’s probability of voting on Election Day.  My results indicate including 
individuals who would normally not receive mobilization messages (i.e., those who do not have 
a history of voting) introduce selection bias.  Once I control for that bias, I find not only are 
individuals with moderate levels of past voting behavior responsive, but so are those with high 
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 v 
and low levels of past turnout.  Receiving a get-out-the-vote door hanger two days prior to an 
election increases the probability of voting by 3.76% for moderate voters, 3.82% for frequent 
voters, and 2.88% for infrequent voters. 
 The effects of mobilization messages are not limited to turnout.  Perhaps more important 
than turnout, I found that a candidate who conducts a last minute GOTV drive can increase their 
vote share by as much as 25%.  This dissertation breaks new ground on the effects of 
mobilization messages and contributes to a clearer picture of those effects. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The study of mobilization has presented scholars with an interesting puzzle as we attempt to 
identify who in the electorate is most responsive to mobilization messages.  The framing of the 
debate by Kenneth M. Goldstein and Matthew Holleque (2010) pits competing theoretical 
arguments against one another without a satisfying conclusion.  On one side is the belief that the 
least politically engaged and least informed segments of the population will likely be most 
affected by mobilization messages (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  That argument is predicated 
on the idea that the politically unengaged benefit most from the cost cutting nature of 
mobilization messages when gathering information about a particular election.  On the other side 
is the belief that only the most informed and politically engaged will respond to mobilization 
messages because they are the ones paying attention to the election, and are thus most receptive 
to new information (Hillygus 2005).  As I will discuss in the pages that follow, a third 
explanation may provide a better framework for studying the debate.  John Zaller’s Receive-
Accept-Sample (RAS) model posits that it is the people with moderate levels of political 
information and interest who will be most affected by media messages.  The caveat to that 
assumption is, however, in order to have new political information affect your opinion you first 
have to receive it.  Thus, understanding who in the electorate is most likely to receive media 
messages, and for the purpose of this project who is most likely to receive mobilization 
messages, is central to understanding the effects of those messages.   
In the media setting for which Zaller applied his RAS model, television viewing (and 
other media consumption) habits can limit or enhance the amount of political information 
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exposure for which an individual comes in contact.  The assumption is that individuals with 
moderate levels of political interest, while not intentionally seeking political information, do not 
intentionally opt out of exposure.  As such, the combination of exposure and malleable opinions 
makes this group most affected by political media messages.  As I will explain and explore in the 
pages that follow, applying the RAS model to the study of mobilization may result in an alternate 
conclusion.   
Arguably, those at the mid-range of political sophistication and interest have malleable 
political opinions.  A case could also be made for low sophisticates possessing movable 
opinions.  If exposure is key, and mobilization messages delivered to the doorstep of an 
individual are more difficult to avoid than media messages, it may be discover the RAS model, 
when applied to the study of mobilization, also affects individuals with low levels of political 
knowledge as it does those in the mid-range of interest and knowledge.   
 In the media setting, individuals self-select the programming for which they are exposed.  
An individual who has low political interest, according to the RAS model, will seek out non-
political programs (entertainment).   Those decisions help insulate an individual from exposure 
to political information.  Individuals in the mid-range of political interest may not specifically 
avoid political programing (news and currents event shows), thus increasing the probability they 
will at least have passive exposure to political information.  It is that passive exposure to political 
messages identified in the RAS model that is the mechanism which enables media messages to 
have an effect.   
In the mobilization setting, the decision to opt in to, or out of, exposure is preempted.  By 
taking the campaign to the doorstep of an individual, even the least politically engaged will 
experience passive exposure to mobilization messages.  If passive exposure has an affect when 
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studying media effects, it seems logical the same could apply with mobilization messages.  The 
primary difference between the media and mobilization environments is who is exposed to the 
messages.  Thus, the conclusions of the RAS model when applied to the study of the effects of 
mobilization messages may differ from Zaller’s earlier conclusions in the media consumption 
environment.   
 Understanding the differences in the information exposure environments of the media 
compared to campaign mobilization is paramount to the current project.  As such, I will compare 
the circumstances within both environments that contribute to how an individual receives 
information, the conditions that improve the probability they will accept the information, and 
thus apply that information (sample) to their current beliefs that hold priority at the time of 
exposure. Thus, understanding who has the highest probability of exposure is the first step in 
applying the RAS model to the study of mobilization effects. 
 
1.1 EXPOSURE TO MOBILIZATION MESSAGES: THE STRATEGIC PARADOX 
 
In the electoral setting, not all individuals are equally important to a political campaign.  
Operating with limited resources of time and money, campaign practitioners strategically target 
individuals in the electorate who they anticipate will be most responsive or supportive to their 
campaign efforts.  As I will explain later, one of the primary filters used by campaign 
practitioners to identify who in the electorate should be contacted during a mobilization drive is 
past voting history (e.g. Grey 2007; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Issenberg 2012) .  As such, 
those with a history of voting have a higher probability of being strategically targeted by a 
political campaign.  It is important to note, however, not only do the strategically targeted 
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frequent voters get exposed to the mobilization message, but so do other individuals residing at 
the same address (e.g., Gerber and Green 2001).  This is because the ability to control who is 
exposed to the message at a particular address is limited.  Whomever answers the door or 
discovers the campaign literature left at their front door receives the mobilization message.  
Thus, when studying the effects of exposure to mobilization messages while applying the RAS 
model, it is important to keep in mind everyone who potentially will be exposed to the message.   
 
1.2 IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGY: STUDYING MOBILIZATION 
 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the mosaic of political science theory on mobilization by 
exploring the challenges scholars face when applying scientific inquiry in an inherently strategic 
environment.  Understanding these challenges has more than trivial implications.  Not only can 
this project provide future scholars with a better understanding of the environment for which we 
study, but it may also offer a roadmap for empirical study of mobilization effects and, perhaps 
even broader, campaign effects.  By applying the RAS model to the study of mobilization we 
may gain a clearer picture of who in the electorate is most responsive to mobilization messages 
and, even broader, campaign messages. 
 
1.3 RECEIVE-ACCEPT-SAMPLE (RAS) MODEL AND THE EFFECTS OF MOBILIZATION 
MESSAGES 
 
Utilizing the Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) Model as a framework to study the effects of 
mobilization messages, the three areas I plan to address in this dissertation include the effects of 
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omitting strategy when studying a phenomenon that is inherently strategic, how to capture which 
individuals are most responsive to mobilization messages in a strategic environment, and 
disentangling the effects of mobilization messages on vote choice from the other effects of a 
campaign.   
 
1.3.1 Effects of omitting strategy when studying a phenomenon that is inherently strategic 
My results indicate that omitting strategy, the kind employed by political practitioners when 
targeting voters, while designing a mobilization study may introduce selection bias.  Ironically, it 
is selection bias that has prompted scholars to omit strategy when studying mobilization, and 
thus presents us with a strategic paradox.  As I will explain in the pages that follow, it may be the 
steps taken to eliminate selection bias that may in fact introduce selection bias.  I will 
demonstrate how that selection bias has ripple effects on the findings of studies using 
nonstrategic samples, or samples achieved by randomizing the entire registered voter population.  
As such, by including strategy when studying mobilization, we can get a clearer picture of who 
in the electorate has the highest probability of exposure to mobilization messages, and thus can 
measure more accurately who is most responsive to mobilization messages.   
 
1.3.2 Identifying who is most responsive to mobilization messages in a strategic 
environment 
Consistent with John Zaller’s RAS model, receiving political information is the first step in 
capturing an effect.  My results indicate infrequent voters residing at strategically targeted 
households during a campaign are, in fact, responsive to mobilization messages.  Applying these 
findings to the RAS model supports the idea that individuals with low levels of past political 
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participation, individuals who would likely opt out of exposure to political media messages, may 
be responsive to mobilization messages when received.  I will explore and discuss the conditions 
for which those effects are strongest.   
 
1.3.3 Disentangling the effects of mobilization messages on vote choice from other 
campaign effects 
Finally, studying the effects of mobilization messages on turnout only provides us with a partial 
picture of mobilization effects in a strategic environment.  If mobilization messages only affect 
turnout, the value of mobilization studies may be limited.  If it is found, however, that 
mobilization messages also affect vote choice, there may be broader implications for the study of 
campaign effects and voter behavior.  After all, mobilization efforts are strategically 
implemented by political campaigns to accomplish the goal of increasing vote share for a 
particular candidate.  My results indicate that a candidate who implements a last minute 
mobilization drive in a low salience primary election can boost their vote share by as much as 
25%.  Those findings, along with the results of the other chapters in this dissertation, contribute 
to our understanding of the effects of mobilization messages, and may open new paths for 
academic inquiry in a strategic environment. 
Prior to addressing the substantive topics of this dissertation, it is first necessary to 
discuss in more detail John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model, and provide a 
framework for applying it to the study of the effects mobilization messages. The next chapter 
provides a roadmap for using the RAS model for mobilization. 
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2.0  CONVERTING THE BASIC RAS MODEL FROM CAPTURING ATTITUDE CHANGE TO 
BEHAVIOR CHANGE: A ROADMAP FOR STUDYING MOBILIZATION 
 
In his seminal work “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion”, John Zaller (1992) outlined a 
model for better understanding how elite discourse affects public opinion.  His “Receive-Accept-
Sample” (RAS) model explored how individuals form their opinions based on what information 
they are exposed to and, predicated on previously held beliefs and information exposure, decide 
which of the new information will be used to update their opinions, and which will be simply 
discarded.   
On the surface, it would appear the study of public opinion and the study of mobilization 
have little in common.  Public opinion is the study of how individuals gather information and 
then apply that information to form a belief system or single preferences on specific issues.  
Mobilization, on the other hand, is the study of the effect of messages on the likelihood an 
individual will turn out to vote.  There are reasons, however, to look to the RAS model for 
guidance on the study of mobilization. 
At its core, the RAS model focuses on who is exposed to information (receive), how that 
information is processed by the exposed individuals (accept), and how that information is used to 
update an individual’s opinion on a specific issue (sample).  As I will outline in this chapter, 
those three basic elements of the RAS model translate well into the mobilization environment, 
and may offer a useful model for assessing the effects of mobilization messages. 
 
 
 
 8 
2.1 RECEIVED: ELITE MESSAGES VS. MOBILIZATION MESSAGES 
 
The first step in Zaller’s RAS model, and the one central to the current project, is the “Receive” 
component.  According to Zaller, politically more aware individuals have a higher probability of 
being exposed to elite discourse.  Due to their media consumption habits, and their general 
interest in politics, these more aware individuals actively seek new information.   In contrast, less 
politically aware individuals tend to opt out of exposure to political information, and by way of 
their media consumption habits, insulate themselves from exposure to elite discourse.  For that 
reason, there is a positive correlation between the probability of receiving elite messages and the 
level of an individual’s political awareness. 
When folding the receive step of the RAS model into the study of mobilization messages, 
some parallels can be drawn.  As I will discuss in more detail in the chapters that follow, a 
positive correlation exists with past political participation and the probability of exposure to 
mobilization messages.  First, political campaigns operate on limited resources of time and 
money.  To more effectively use those limited resources, campaign practitioners often use 
strategic targeting to focus campaign efforts.  Specifically, campaigns target individuals who are 
most likely to vote (e.g. Grey 2007; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Issenberg 2012).  Thus, if 
individuals with a voting history are more likely to be targeted for exposure to mobilization 
messages, and individuals who lack a voting history have a higher probability of being ignored, a 
positive correlation exists between the probability of receiving a mobilization message and the 
level of an individual’s past political participation. 
 
 
 9 
2.2 ACCEPT: THE SECOND STEP IN ATTITUDE CHANGE 
 
For attitude change to take place within the RAS model, a two-step process is involved.  The 
first, as outlined above, is exposure (reception) to new ideas.  The second involves the 
acceptance of some of the new considerations.  There are barriers, however, at the individual 
level that make the acceptance process conditional.  Specifically, the barriers, or resistance as 
outlined by Zaller, can take three forms: Partisan Resistance, Inertial Resistance and 
Countervalent Resistance.   
 
Partisan Resistance captures the resistance associated with an individual’s underlying 
predispositions on a specific issue.  Thus, if the individual receives a message that is 
inconsistent with their already held beliefs, that information will be discounted or 
disregarded outright.  The number one heuristic in politics is party identification.  As 
such, if a message received is inconsistent with an individual’s PID, that message is not 
likely to be accepted. 
 
Inertial Resistance takes into consideration the relative level of information the 
individual already possesses.  Individuals who already have large stores of information 
will be better equipped to assess the value of a new message.  That repository of 
information functions as a barrier for new information to be accepted.  Individuals who 
have limited information, on the other hand, are more likely to accept the new message 
when compared to a highly informed individual.  Their limited information provides 
them with less ability to resist the new message. 
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Countervalent Resistance is the final roadblock for accepting new messages.  In an 
information environment where an individual is exposed to contradictory messages 
(countervalent messages), the individual is forced to decide which message to accept, and 
which to reject.  Thus, an individual will contemplate the two or more messages and 
assess which message is consistent with their already held beliefs.   
 
All three forms of resistance are conditional on the level of information the individual 
already possess.  Thus, political sophistication is positively correlated with each type of 
resistance.  This creates an interesting puzzle.  Those individuals who are most aware have a 
higher probability of being exposed to (receive) new messages, but it is those same individuals 
who are most likely to be resistant to new information.  At the other end of the spectrum, less 
aware individuals are much less likely to be exposed to new information, but when exposed, they 
are more likely to accept the new information.  Once again, as I will explain in detail later, 
parallels can be drawn when applying the RAS model to the study of mobilization. 
 
2.3 ACCEPT: THE SECOND STEP IN BEHAVIOR CHANGE 
 
Applying the two step process in the RAS model for attitude change (receive and accept) to 
behavior change within the context of mobilization, I replace attitude with turnout.  The top 
predictor as to whether an individual will vote in an upcoming election is their past voting 
behavior (e.g. Gerber, Green and Shachar 2003).  Often used as a filter for strategically targeting 
voters during a mobilization drive, practitioners and academics use turnout as a measure for 
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behavior change.  As such, the three forms of resistance in the context of attitude change also 
apply to behavior change in mobilization. 
Along with attitude change, partisan resistance is an important roadblock for 
mobilization.  Mobilization messages first have to be receive, but after that, the three forms of 
resistance in the RAS model come into play.  With PID as the most readily used heuristic by 
individuals, a mobilization message that is inconsistent with the partisanship of the individual 
voter will likely be rejected (e.g. Huckfeldt, Levine, Morgan, and Sprague 1999).   
Inertial resistance comes into play when looking at past voting behavior.  If voting is a 
habit (Gerber, Green and Shachar 2003), the longer an individual has historically voted on 
Election Day, the less effective we would anticipate a mobilization message to be at altering 
behavior.  The ability to affect change is hindered when the message encourages a behavior the 
individual is already doing.  At the mid-range of past political participation, what I label as an 
Intermittent Voter, the RAS model in the media environment would anticipate the largest effect 
for those individuals.  Applied to the study of mobilization, the RAS model may also provide 
support for the least politically involved, what I label as Infrequent Voters, to also be affected by 
mobilization messages.  This is an empirical question I intend to address later. 
Finally, countervalent resistance comes into play when multiple campaigns are actively 
vying for attention.  Individuals are faced with having to consider the mobilization messages 
from various sources.  In the end, if none of those messages can overcome the status quo 
behavior, no alteration in turnout will be realized.  
As I outlined earlier, the three forms of resistance present an interesting puzzle when 
studying opinion change.  Individuals who have the most information are most likely to be 
exposed to new messages.  Due to their already high levels of awareness, however, that new 
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message is less likely to be accepted.  Consistent with those findings, when studying 
mobilization, individuals who vote regularly are also most likely to be exposed to mobilization 
messages.  Similar to the resistance to attitude change, mobilization messages will likely have 
little effect on the voting behavior of a regular voter.  Conversely, individuals who may be 
receptive to mobilization messages, those who do not vote regularly (infrequent voters and 
intermittent voters) are less likely to receive the mobilization message. 
 
2.4 SAMPLE: THE EFFECT OF THE NEW MESSAGE 
 
The third component of the RAS model is the use of the new information (sampling) when 
responding to a survey.  Assuming an individual was first exposed to the new information and 
then accepts that information after consideration, they are left with having to update their current 
attitude structure.  Thus, the sample stage of the RAS model is the application of the new 
information to update attitudes.  
Bridging the sample stage within the study of attitude change to the study of 
mobilization, I once again replace attitude change with behavior change.  Assuming an 
individual is exposed to a mobilization message, and after considering the message, accepts it, 
the sample stage would be the effect of the message on the voting behavior of the individual.  An 
increase in the probability of turning out to vote would be an indication of the sampling by the 
individual exposed to the mobilization message.  In the chapters that follow, I will specify how I 
intend to measure an increase in the probability of turning out to vote.   
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2.5 MOVING FORWARD: RAS AND MOBILIZATION 
 
Prior to applying the RAS model to the current mobilization project, it is first necessary to 
review what is already known about the effects of mobilization messages.  In the next chapter, I 
review the lessons learned from prior mobilization studies, and discuss how the RAS model may 
help fill in some of the gaps in the current extant literature on mobilization.   
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3.0  LITERATURE REVIEW: SETTING THE STAGE 
 
In this dissertation, I set out to answer two unresolved questions regarding mobilization.  The 
first is to address who in the electorate is most responsive to mobilization efforts.  The second 
question focuses on the effects of mobilization messages on vote choice.   
For the first question, prior studies have arrived at contradictory conclusions, providing 
us with an interesting puzzle.  Some scholars have argued that it is the least informed and 
motivated segments of the population that are most mobilizeable (e.g. Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993), while others contend that it is the most informed and most likely to vote who respond to 
mobilization messages (e.g. Hillygus 2005, 2010). In this chapter I review the body of research 
conducted on the effects of mobilization messages. It is those prior works that set the stage for 
applying John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model to the field of mobilization 
research.  
For the second question, I turn my attention to what has been learned about campaign 
effects on vote choice and apply that information to the study of the effects of mobilization 
messages.  I explore the role of priming, learning and persuasion in the effects of campaign 
messages on vote choice decisions. 
 
3.1 RECEPTION: WHO GETS CONTACTED DURING A MOBILIZATION DRIVE 
 
To capture who in the electorate is most responsive to mobilization efforts, we must first identify 
who in the electorate is most likely to be contacted by a political campaign during a mobilization 
drive.  Campaigns operate on limited resources of time and money.  Because of those limits, 
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campaigns must prioritize whom they focus their resources.  Few campaigns, if any, have the 
ability to contact every registered voter in the days leading up to an election.  Thus, they are 
forced to use various winnowing techniques to narrow down the population they will attempt to 
contact.  The criteria most often used is past voting history (e.g. Grey 2007; Holbrook and 
McClurg 2005; Issenberg 2012).   National and state-wide campaigns often use more nuanced 
methods for targeting voters, but the data for those methods is often out of the price range for 
down ballot campaigns.  As such, the vast majority of local campaigns rely on public voter data 
files provided by their local election offices.  This data provides basic demographic information, 
the address of each registered voter, their party identification, and a record for which elections 
they cast a ballot.  It is this last piece of information that is used to identify frequent voters.  If 
past voting behavior is a good predictor of future behavior (e.g. Gerber, Green and Shachar 
2003), it is rational for a campaign to target voters with a track record of voting.   
This brings us to an interesting dilemma.  The scientific method prompts us to take every 
step possible to eliminate, or at least reduce, bias in our data.  As such, when conducting 
mobilization studies scholars opt to randomize the entire voting population.  By randomizing the 
entire population the effects of any systematic behaviors present in the population being studied 
will be reduced through the aggregation of that population.  Interestingly, by randomizing the 
entire registered voter population to implement a mobilization field experiment, we may 
inadvertently be introducing selection bias into a study.  Political practitioners do not randomly 
select who they will contact during a mobilization drive.  Thus, the inclusion of individuals in a 
study who would normally be ignored by a campaign may distance our study from the 
phenomenon under investigation (Goldstein and Holleque 2010).   
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This is not to say there is no value in understanding the effects of mobilization messages 
on individuals who would normally be ignored by a political campaign due to their past voting 
behavior.  As I will explain in this chapter, there are theoretical reasons to take those steps when 
the question being explored is attempting to test a hypothetical scenario where mobilization 
efforts by political practitioners would be expanded to include individuals who would not 
normally be targeted.  Once again, however, we need to return to how campaigns identify who to 
contact during an actual mobilization drive to better understand the effects of mobilization 
messages.  Campaigns operate on limited resources of time and money.  As such, with the 
priority of winning elections, they strategically target where to commit their limited resources.  
Both the academic community and the political practitioner discipline agree that past voting 
behavior is the best predictor of future behavior (e.g. Gerber, Green and Shachar 2003; Grey 
2007).  Because political campaigns conduct mobilization efforts, it seems logical that if the goal 
is to gain a better understanding of the effects of mobilization messages, the scholarly 
community should be cognoscente of the methods used by the practitioners implementing the 
phenomenon of interest.     
As I will explain in the next section, folding this back into the discussion of identifying 
voters most receptive to mobilization efforts, if we disregard the strategies employed by political 
campaigns to target those they intend to mobilize, and randomize the entire population for a 
study, we are likely introducing selection bias into our model.  That selection bias comes from 
the inclusion of individuals in the treatment group who would not normally be targeted by a 
campaign (Goldstein and Holleque 2010).  Unresolved, however, is the effect of the selection 
bias on the results of mobilization studies.  If Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) are correct, and it is 
the least informed and least politically motivated who are most responsive to mobilization 
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efforts, then the results of studies that randomize all registered voters will likely have 
exaggerated effects from mobilization.  By including a large group of individuals who would 
normally be skipped by a campaign, but who are more responsive to mobilization messages, the 
results from that study would be artificially inflated.  Conversely, if Hillygus (2005) is correct 
and it is only the most informed and highly politically motivated individuals who respond to 
mobilization messages, studies randomizing the entire population will likely have understated 
results from mobilization field experiments.  Essentially, including a large population of 
individuals in a study who would normally be ignored by a campaign, and who are not 
responsive to mobilization messages, will water down the results of a mobilization study. 
 
3.2 ACCEPT: IDENTIFYING WHO IS MOST RESPONSIVE TO MOBILIZATION MESSAGES 
 
The issue of selection bias introduced by sample selection should be resolved before moving 
forward with identifying who is most responsive to mobilization messages.  If it is found 
selection bias is introduced by randomizing the entire registered voter population instead of 
randomizing a strategically targeted sample, it will have implications for past mobilization study 
findings.   
Some might argue that the two questions are inherently mutually exclusive.  If you 
eliminate individuals who would not normally be targeted by a campaign from your sample, 
namely infrequent voters, you are removing the very people democratic theorists want to reach.  
That concern, however, would be misguided.  Campaigns do attempt to focus the majority of 
their resources on those who they feel are most likely to vote and, more importantly, likely to 
vote for their candidate (e.g. Grey 2007; Pelosi 2007).  The caveat to that assumption is that 
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many infrequent voters and infrequent voters live with frequent voters.  Because campaigns often 
have no control over who at a given address will be ‘treated’ by the mobilization efforts (face-to-
face contact, literature drops, direct mail, telephone calls, etc.), samples utilizing the winnowing 
efforts employed by campaigns will still include infrequent voters.  Thus a study that employs 
strategic targeting can capture the different effects of mobilization efforts on frequent, 
intermittent and infrequent voters while reducing the selection bias introduced by conducting a 
study with individuals who would not normally come in contact with a mobilization message. 
 
3.3 SAMPLE: THE EFFECTS OF MOBILIZATION MESSAGES ON MOBILIZATION AND VOTE 
CHOICE 
 
As I discussed above, one of the primary goals of this project is to better identify who in the 
electorate is responsive to mobilization messages.  In the RAS model framework, the mechanism 
to capture whether an individual has accepted the mobilization message is to observe the effect it 
has on their voting behavior.  Thus, the third and final stage of the RAS model, sample, will be 
captured by the increased probability the mobilization message has on turnout.  As I outlined in 
Chapter 2, for a message to have been successfully sampled it must first be received, then 
accepted, and finally be used as a consideration when making a decision to turnout on Election 
Day.  As such, the increased probability of turning out to vote can serve as a measure of the 
sample stage of the RAS model applied to the study of mobilization. 
 The second primary question of this project explores the effect mobilization messages 
have on vote choice.  Once again, this involves the sample stage of the RAS model.  Not only 
can a mobilization message alter the considerations used by an individual when deciding to turn 
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out to vote, it may also affect the considerations as to whom to vote for.  To address this topic, 
which will be expanded upon later in this literature review, I first identify the mechanisms at 
work when an individual makes a voting decision.  To facilitate that discussion, I explore the 
literature on campaign effects. 
 With the two primary questions of this project in mind (who is mobilizeable, and the 
effects mobilization messages have on vote choice), the remainder of this chapter explores the 
extant literature on what we know about those two questions.  This literature review will help 
provide the foundation for the present study by not only identifying what we know, but also 
focusing in on what is still unresolved.  
 To organize this literature review, I start by exploring the lessons learned from past 
mobilization studies.  This will provide the reader with a better understanding of which modes of 
mobilization have been found to be most effective.  I follow that discussion with a review of the 
studies that have attempted to identify who in the electorate is most responsive to mobilization 
messages.  I conclude with a review of the efforts to capture the effects of campaign messages on 
vote choice and how that translates to the effects of mobilization messages. 
 
3.4 LESSONS LEARNED: NONPARTISAN MOBILIZATION 
 
Mobilization, by definition, is any effort by a campaign or political party to increase the turnout 
of voters favorable to their success.  Mobilization efforts employed by campaigns come in 
multiple forms.  On the list of mobilization efforts are mass media advertisements (television, 
radio, newspaper and the Internet), direct mail, email, telephone calls, door-to-door canvassing, 
and leaving campaign literature on the front door of the residences of voters (literature drops).   
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In the past 40-plus years there has been a shift from more personal mobilization efforts like door-
to-door canvassing and literature drops, what I call doorstep politics, to less personal forms of 
contact via mass media advertising, direct mail and using professional phone banks.   This shift 
has been identified as one of the leading causes for the aggregate decline in voter turnout during 
that period (e.g. Avery 1989; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Teixeira 1987, 1992).  Testing that 
assertion, several scholars employed field experiments to capture the effects of various 
nonpartisan mobilization efforts.  Aggregate increases in turnout have been achieved through 
door-to-door canvassing (Gerber and Green 1999, 2000b; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003), 
leaflet distribution (Gerber and Green 2000a; Nickerson, Friedricks and King 2006), small 
increases via direct mail (Gerber and Green 2000b; Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008), and 
contrary to the belief of campaign practitioners (Grey 2007; Pelosi 2007) the use of the telephone 
has not proven to be an effective tool for mobilization (Gerber and Green 2000, 2001; see also 
Nickerson 2007).  While these prior studies helped the discipline take a step forward in 
understanding the mechanisms that increase aggregate turnout, they left open for debate the 
relative effectiveness of those mobilization efforts on getting infrequent voters to the polls.  The 
conclusions drawn from those studies, however, may be limited due to the fact they were 
conducted in an artificial setting, which does not accurately mimic the mobilization efforts 
conducted by an actual partisan campaign.  As stated above, the goal of a political campaign or 
political party is to increase the turnout of individuals who are supportive.  As such, generic get 
out the vote drives may not accurately capture the effects of mobilization efforts during an actual 
campaign. 
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3.5 LESSONS LEARNED: PARTISAN MOBILIZATION 
 
Understanding the limitations imposed by conducting nonpartisan get out the vote experiments, 
some scholars attempted to apply the lessons learned on voter mobilization in a more realistic 
setting.  Teaming up with the Michigan Democratic Party Youth Coordinated Campaign, 
Nickerson, Friedrichs and King (2006) set out to capture the effects of door hangers, volunteer 
phone calls and face-to-face canvassing.  They concluded that all three modes of contact yielded 
similar cost effectiveness when identifying the time and monetary expenses used to get one 
person to vote.   Using time as the measure of cost, the least expensive mode of contact was 
leaflet drops, followed by volunteer phone calls, and the most time consuming was face-to-face 
canvassing.   Due to the efficient nature of leaflet drops, from a time and money perspective, it is 
one of the most accessible modes of campaigning for campaigns with limited resources.  For that 
reason, as I will explain in more detail in the chapters that follow, leaflet distribution will be the 
mode of contact used for this dissertation.   
The calculation for the monetary costs can vary depending on whether volunteers or paid 
campaign staff is used, thus one could question the formula used by Nickerson, Friedrichs and 
King (2006).  Their calculation was based on an average hourly pay-rate for campaign staff, plus 
the monetary cost for printing expenses and a phone bank, divided by the number of votes 
(increased turnout) each mode yielded on Election Day.  Their instinct to capture the time and 
monetary costs of mobilization efforts, both scarce resources for most campaigns, should be 
applauded.  Their findings shed light on the tradeoffs of using different modes of mobilization.  
Still undetermined, however, is who, based on voter propensity, is most receptive to each mode 
of contact.    
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Building on the findings of Nickerson, Freidrich and King (2006), Panagopoulos (2009) 
set out to test the effectiveness of partisan messages compared to nonpartisan messages.  
Conducted during municipal elections in Albany, New York, a series of phone calls were made 
to registered Democrats and Republicans.  The partisan appeal simply encouraged voters to 
support candidates of a particular party.  No specific candidate endorsement was included in the 
appeal.  The nonpartisan appeal encouraged people to vote with no endorsement of a political 
party.  Panagopoulos found that partisan phone calls are no more effective at mobilization when 
compared to nonpartisan appeals.  These finding lend support to the generalizeability of prior 
nonpartisan mobilization studies.  However, the mode used for the study, phone calls, has been 
found to be the least effective mode for mobilization voters (e.g. Gerber and Green 2000, 2001).  
Thus utilizing a mobilization mode of contact which has been demonstrated to achieve weak 
effects may compromise what can be taken away from that study. 
Taking a different approach to conducting a mobilization study in a more realistic setting, 
Cardy (2005) teamed up with a pro-choice organization during a gubernatorial primary election.  
Often, special interest groups get involved in supporting an endorsed candidate, and thus 
campaign on behalf of a candidate.  Utilizing direct mail and phone calls, the group contacted 
voters identified to be pro-choice.  Similar to the Michigan youth group in the Nickerson, 
Freidrich and King (2006) study, the pro-choice organization openly identified itself with each 
mode of contact.  The results indicate that direct mail and phone calls from an interest group had 
no effect on vote choice, as captured by a follow-up phone survey, or on turnout.   The results 
draw into question the relative value of direct mail, and reconfirms phone calls as not an 
effective means to mobilize voters (Gerber and Green 2000, 2001; see also Nickerson 2007).  
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Additionally, it is important to note that the study was limited by the fact it did not have exact 
contact rates, making the results unreliable.   
In both the Nickerson, Freidrich and King (2006) and Panagopoulos (2009) studies the 
appeals made to voters were generic partisan appeals with no specific endorsement of a 
candidate.  The Cardy (2005) study limited its contacts to only include Democrats and 
Independents identified to be pro-choice.  While those three studies attempted to capture the 
effects of mobilization efforts in a more realistic setting, they still leave open for speculation how 
effective mobilization efforts are when the message comes directly from a candidate for public 
office or his/her campaign.  Additionally those studies, like the nonpartisan studies before them, 
only looked at aggregate turnout rates.  The question remains, who is most receptive, on an 
individual basis, to mobilization efforts?   
Building on the prior studies that have speculated who in the electorate is most 
responsive to mobilization messages, it becomes clear the study of mobilization lacks a coherent 
theory for anticipating the answer.  As I pointed out earlier, some believe it is the population of 
least likely voters who will respond the most positively to mobilization messages (e.g. 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), while others anticipate only the most likely to vote will be 
receptive (e.g. Hillygus 2005).  If we turn our attention to the study of persuasion and media 
effects, we can even make an argument that it will be voters who fall in the mid-range of voting 
propensity, or what psychologists call intermediate or ambivalent subjects (Armitage and Conner 
2000), who will be most receptive to mobilization efforts.  In his seminal work, John Zaller 
(1992) found that media effects are most pronounced with people who have a moderate interest 
in politics.  He concludes that it is the most attentive members of the public who have already 
made up their minds about key issues or candidates, and thus are not swayed by media messages 
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(see also Jacks and Devine 2000).  At the other end of the spectrum, he found that the least 
attentive are also not swayed by media messages.  His reasoning is the least politically interested 
choose to not consume media messages (see also Albarracin and Wyer 2001).  It is this lack of 
exposure to those messages that mitigates the effects of media messages.  Thus, it is the 
population that has moderate levels of interest and sophistication who are most affected by media 
messages.  If true, we can assume the least engaged will continue to be unengaged, and the most 
attentive are impervious to mobilization messages.  Unresolved is the effect of media messages 
on the least engaged when the option to opt out of exposure is removed. 
 
3.6 WHO IS MOBILIZEABLE? 
 
To this point, no one has directly applied Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model to the 
study of mobilization.  While some have mentioned aspects of the RAS model as a possible 
explanation for who in the electorate is most affected by mobilization messages, the results from 
those studies have provided inconsistent results.  Paralleling Zaller’s findings, David Niven 
(2001, 2004) found that voters whose propensity to vote falls in the mid-range are the most 
responsive to mobilization efforts.  His first article (Niven 2001) looked at the effect of a door-
to-door signature collection drive to get a candidate’s name on the ballot as a means for boosting 
turnout.   Niven utilized the contact records from several campaigns for State Representative in 
Florida to identify voters who were contacted for a signature.  Neighborhoods were selected by 
candidates based on the geographic concentration of registered voters.  While not consistent with 
the randomization steps needed for a field experiment, Niven found that occasional voters 
experienced the largest increase in turnout rates, with infrequent voters experiencing hardly any 
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increase in turnout.  Niven’s second study (2004) captured the effect of door-to-door canvassing 
in a nonpartisan Mayoral race in Florida.  The canvassing was conducted by members of a local 
union who endorsed one of the candidates, and by church group volunteers who delivered a 
generic get out the vote message.  The inconsistent mobilization messages and the lack of 
randomization draw into question his conclusions.   His results, however, support his earlier 
finding that intermittent voters, or voters who fall in the mid-range between infrequent voters 
and frequent voters, are the most responsive to mobilization efforts. 
In a more nuanced analysis of voter mobilization, Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) found 
that the effectiveness of mobilization efforts is contingent on the salience of an election.  
Conducting a reanalysis of eleven door-to-door field experiments, they set out to identify which 
voters are most affected by face-to-face mobilization.   The nonpartisan message delivered to 
each household was “please vote.”  They found that in highly salient elections, like a presidential 
election year, the voters with high and medium propensities to vote have already decided to vote.  
Thus it is the voters with lower propensities to vote who are most affected by mobilization 
efforts.  However, in low salient races, it is only voters with higher propensities to vote who will 
respond to mobilization tactics.  Those in the middle will respond to mobilization messages 
when the salience of the race falls somewhere in the middle, like a mayoral race.   The basis for 
their argument is that each voter has a tipping point as to when they will decide to vote.  That 
tipping point is contingent on the salience of a particular election.  Given the majority of 
elections in the United States fall into the low salience category, Arceneaux and Nickerson’s 
findings provide little comfort for advocates who want to increase the political engagement of 
the infrequent voting segments of the population.  If mobilization messages only reach low 
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propensity voters during the most salient races, mobilization efforts may not be effective at 
getting infrequent voters to the polls on Election Day. 
On the surface it would appear the debate on the effectiveness of mobilization messages 
to get low propensity voters to the polls has been settled.  Niven (2001, 2004) found that 
intermittent voters are the most receptive to mobilization efforts.  The setting for both of his 
studies was what Arceneaux and Nickerson would classify as mid-range salient elections.  Thus 
his findings are consistent with a model that controls for the salience of an election, with 
mobilization efforts affecting intermittent voters during a mid-range salient election (Arceneaux 
and Nickerson 2009).  While those prior studies provide a good framework for assessing the 
effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness, of mobilization efforts to get infrequent voters to the 
polls, they also leave room for improvement.  Specifically, all three studies only look at the 
effect of door-to-door canvassing, the methods used by Niven draw into question his results, 
Arceneaux and Nickerson used data that randomized the entire population which, as I pointed 
out earlier, may have introduced selection bias and thus affected their results, and all three 
studies do not accurately capture the effect of mobilization messages employed in an actual 
political campaign.  A study that looks at other modes of mobilization, utilizing sound strategic 
randomization methods, and conducted in a realistic setting that mirrors an actual campaign can 
help bring the discipline closer to understanding the effect of mobilization messages on voters 
with different turnout propensities. 
Besides the normative implications attached to the conclusions reached by prior studies 
of mobilization that low propensity voters are not affected by mobilization messages, it appears 
to be theoretically inconsistent with the microfoundations of voter behavior theory.  The primary 
disconnect stems from the issue of exposure.  In the realm of media effects, an individual can opt 
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out of exposure to media messages.  By avoiding news programming, a voter can essentially 
insulate oneself from exposure to political messages.  This line of thought is supported by 
previous studies that found changes in behavior hinged on the exposure to campaign messages 
(e.g., Hillygus and Shields 2008; Holbrook 1996).  Opting out of exposure to mobilization 
messages is a little more difficult.  The fact that canvassers bring the message to the doorsteps of 
voters, the ability to avoid exposure may not be as easy as changing the channel on the 
television.   If exposure is a key component to persuasion, one could argue that the conclusions 
of Zaller (1992) would be different if the least attentive were forced to watch the news.  
Historical analysis appears to support this argument.  The average political sophistication of the 
American public was highest when opting out of exposure to the evening news was more 
difficult (e.g. Iyengar and McGrady 2006).  In the late 60s to early 70s, if a television was turned 
on at 6:00 PM, the option was ABC, NBC or CBS evening news.  Even the least interested 
segments of the population were exposed to current events and political information, if they 
watched TV during that time, thus increasing the aggregate political sophistication of the 
American populous.  Bringing those findings into the discussion of mobilization, it can be 
anticipated those who would normally opt out of exposure to campaign messages can still be 
affected by mobilization messages, especially when that message is brought to their doorstep.  
Utilizing the Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model at the theoretical underpinning for the 
current project, the chapters that follow will test the effect of mobilization messages on 
individuals with different turnout propensities.  Once again, the component that is central to this 
project is the receive stage of the model. 
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3.7 VOTE CHOICE 
 
As I pointed out earlier, the goal of political practitioners is not to achieve an increase in 
aggregate turnout.  Instead, they are focused on increasing the turnout of voters who are more 
likely to support their candidate.  As such, a political campaign targets households who, based on 
past turnout history, have a higher probability of voting and who are believed to likely support 
their candidate.  Turnout rates, however, tell us very little about how successful a mobilization 
drive has been for a particular campaign.  The mobilization drive may have increased turnout, 
but that increased turnout may not have benefitted the campaign.  Aggregate vote share is also 
limited in its ability to identify the success of a mobilization drive.  Simply getting the most 
votes, or even losing the election, is not an accurate measure for capturing the effectiveness of a 
mobilization drive.  It may be found that despite the ineffectiveness of a campaign’s mobilization 
messages, they were still able to win. Concluding that the mobilization efforts contributed to the 
victory would be folly.  For that reason, understanding the effects of mobilization messages on 
vote choice is a key component of the study of mobilization, and one that has largely been 
overlooked.      
The knowledge we have gained about the effects of campaigns on vote choice centers 
heavily on U.S. presidential campaigns and Congressional contests, but little is known about 
down ballot low salience campaign effects.  As I have outlined above, the renaissance of field 
experiments in mobilization studies has contributed to our understanding of the effects of 
mobilization messages on turnout.  Applying Zaller’s RAS model, the sample stage of the model 
posits once an individual has received the mobilization message and accepted the message, for it 
to have an effect it must then be used to alter the voting behavior (sampled) of the individual.  
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Turnout is one way to measure the effect of the mobilization message at the sample stage.  The 
other measure is the effect it has on vote choice. For that reason, it is important to understand 
campaign effects in the vote choice process.  In the next section I provide a brief overview of 
campaign effects research that is applicable to the vote choice process. 
 
3.8 CAMPAIGN EFFECTS 
 
The study of campaign effects can best be summarized by the changes over time in the way we 
define what constitutes a meaningful campaign effect.  The earliest studies of campaign effects 
focused on the ability of a message to convert the voting intentions of individuals.  Those 
studies, which found few if any people experienced such a drastic conversion, concluded that 
most people did not change their mind over the course of a campaign, and instead relied heavily 
on their predispositions of partisan attachments and policy attitudes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and 
McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944).  Scholars concluded that campaigns have 
minimal effects on voters. 
 Subsequent studies provided theoretical support for the minimal effects conclusion, 
arguing that campaigns are little more than political noise that signify nothing of substance 
(Holbrook 1996; Iyengar 2001; Shaw 1999).  Furthering that argument in the U.S. presidential 
campaign setting, it was concluded that campaigns have only a small net effect because the 
candidates are balanced in both skills and money.  As such, for every move one candidate makes 
the opposition has a counter move, thus neutralizing each other and resulting in an aggregate 
effect of zero (Finkel 1993).  The challenge with that conclusion, however, is its applicability (or 
lack of) to other political contests.  As with many of the theoretical conclusions drawn about 
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campaign effects, the minimal effects thesis is derived from studying high salience elections.  
The low information and low salience nature of down ballot local campaigns, which comprise 
the vast majority of campaigns in the United States, may not fit well into the minimal effects 
theory.  If the assumption is that both sides are equally matched, and thus are unable to gain 
much momentum, it seems logical to study campaign effects in a setting where candidates are 
not necessarily equally matched in skills and resources (Iyengar and Simon 2000).  
 The focus on “conversion” as a measure of campaign effects has long been questioned as 
a valid measure.  Instead, scholars have looked at more indirect campaign effects like learning, 
campaign priming, and mobilization.  To that end, I need to explore the effects of campaigns on 
learning, priming, and voter persuasion; all factors that have been identified as contributing to 
vote choice. 
 
3.9 LEARNING 
 
At the basic core of a campaign is the effort to inform voters about a particular candidate or an 
issue.  The goal, naturally, is to persuade voters to support (or oppose) the candidate or issue. But 
from a learning perspective, campaigns facilitate the learning process by providing the electorate 
with information germane to a particular election.  Campaign learning has been shown to directly 
shape how voters make their vote choice (e,g, Popkin 1991).  Thus, an understanding of how 
voters learn during a campaign is an important aspect for this project. 
 From a behavioral perspective, not all voters are created equal.  Voters vary in their 
political sophistication and in their propensities to vote.  As such, it is difficult to measure which 
mode of campaigning is best at informing the general public.  Most of the factors identified as 
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key to the learning process in a campaign are centered heavily on campaign activities in high 
salience elections.  Presidential debates (Chaffee 1978; Holbrook 1999), television advertising 
(Johnson, Hagen and Jamieson 2004; Ridout et al. 2004), and news coverage (Johnson et al. 
2004) are campaign staples in well-funded high profile contests.  The further down the ballot you 
go, the smaller the campaign budget and often the less newsworthy the office.  For that reason, 
the theoretical underpinnings that guide our understanding of the learning process in campaigns 
are limited to the top of the ticket campaigns.    
 Further complicating the study of learning in a campaign is the consistent conclusion that 
average voters are cognitive misers.  Voters often rely on long-term characteristics like party 
identification, group identity, and retrospective evaluations (Campbell et al. 1960).  Those 
characteristics can prove useful in high salience races, but provide little guidance in a down 
ballot election, or a primary election when all the candidates share the same basic characteristics.  
 Studies that have explored the learning process outside of presidential campaigns also 
provide little guidance for down-ballot low salience elections.  Focusing on Gubernatorial races 
(Carsey 2000), U.S. Senate races (Kahn and Kenney 1999), and U.S. House races (Jacobson 
1983), while less salient than a presidential contest, arguably are not low salience affairs.  As 
such, little is known about the learning process in campaigns that do not rely on televised news 
reports, commercials or debates.  This study is breaking new ground in the study of campaign 
learning and its effect on vote choice.  The information sharing process in this study, as I will 
explain in more detail later, focuses on retail politics, or what I call doorstep politics. 
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3.10 PRIMING 
 
Not only do campaigns facilitate the information sharing process needed for citizen learning, 
they also help guide voters as to which issues and traits should be used when evaluating each 
campaign.  Thus campaigns prime the electorate to value certain issues and traits over others 
(Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  Naturally, a campaign will attempt to frame an issue in the most 
favorable way to benefit their candidate, but by simply elevating an issue in the minds of the 
electorate, regardless of the frame, a campaign can shape the standards by which a candidate is 
evaluated (Druckman 2004; Johnston et al. 1992).  If this is true in high salience races like 
presidential campaigns, it can be deduced the effect is amplified in a race where voters have 
limited information about the candidates, or even less information about the function and 
responsibilities of a down-ballot office.   
 One aspect of priming that has received a lot of attention is its ability to activate partisan 
attachments (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; McClurg and Holbrook 2005).  The belief 
is that by priming voters to think about partisanship, the campaign is encouraging fellow 
partisans to remember why they are affiliated with the political party (e.g., Finkel 1993).  In the 
context of a primary election, when all the candidates on the ballot are of the same party , the 
activation of partisan attachments provides voters with little assistance when making a voting 
decision.  As such, for priming to be useful in the decision making process, we need to identify 
which primes might have the most effect in down-ballot elections and primary contests.  For that 
I turn my attention to John Zaller’s work on the frequency and recency of exposure to 
mobilization messages. 
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 The process by which primes work is by making information more accessible in the 
memory (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002).  Thus, exposure to 
the prime brings that information to the ”top of the head” when making decisions (Zaller 1992).  
Key to this assumption is the exposure to the message.  If a voter is able to opt out of exposure, 
which is often the case with messages delivered via the television, then the message can have no 
effect.  If the message is delivered to the front door of an individual’s residence, however, the 
ability to avoid exposure to the message is greatly reduced.  To that end, frames delivered via 
doorstep politics likely have a higher potential of being received than do frames delivered via the 
television. 
 
3.11 PERSUASION 
 
Ultimately, it comes down to the persuasiveness of the information learned or primed.  For the 
purpose of this project, I define persuasion as any campaign induced changes in the attitudes or 
considerations that underlie the vote decision (Hillygus 2010).  It is not necessary for a campaign 
to manipulate a voter or change her underlying predispositions for it to influence her vote choice.  
In the case of partisan activation, a campaign is simply reminding a voter about her partisan ties.  
For a low information down ballot campaign, simply providing information about the candidate 
or political office can facilitate the learning process, and thus affect the information used to make 
a vote decision.  It is the learning and priming process of a campaign that has been identified as 
the mechanism by which individuals may change their vote choice (Hillygus and Shields 2008).  
In other words, campaigns persuade voters by facilitating the learning process and priming them 
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to value certain issues or candidate traits.  Applying the RAS model, the sample stage is where 
the persuasiveness of a mobilization message comes into play. 
 
3.12 BRIDGING TURNOUT PERSUASION WITH VOTE CHOICE PERSUASION 
 
We are still a long way from fully understanding who is persuadable and under what conditions 
persuasion has the largest effect (Hillygus 2010).  We can, however, build on what we do know 
about persuasion, specifically how it relates to mobilization messages and turnout, to gain a 
better understanding of the persuasiveness of mobilization messages on vote choice.  Prior 
studies, including the chapters in the current project, have identify the persuasive power of 
mobilization messages to increase the probability an individual will cast a vote on Election Day.  
We now need to bridge what we know about turnout with the potential persuasive effects of 
mobilization messages on vote choice.  Utilizing the definition of persuasion outlined above, we 
can now chart a path for testing the effectiveness of mobilization messages to inform and prime 
voters in a down ballot campaign, resulting in a change in the criteria for making their voting 
decision.   
 From a simple logic perspective, it seems improbable that a mobilization message can 
have an effect on the probability of turning out to vote but have no effect on the voting decision 
process.  While it could be argued that voters in high salience races make up their minds well in 
advance of Election Day, and thus a mobilization message is simply a reminder to go vote, for 
down ballot contests, voters often lack the needed information to make a decision.  In these low 
salience campaigns, a mobilization message not only is a reminder to vote, but also serves as a 
learning and priming opportunity for a voter.  In Zaller’s RAS model, the first assumption for a 
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message to have an effect is that it is received.  Once received, the repetition of the message, and 
more importantly for the present study, the recency of the message elevates the information to 
the “top of the head.”  Due to the low salience nature of a down ballot campaign, campaign 
messages often go unchallenged.   
 Clearly, if different voters are receiving different campaign messages, it becomes more 
complicated to estimate the effect of each message.  This is largely the reason some have 
characterized campaigns as a cacophony of noise that makes little difference in the voting 
decisions of voters (e.g., Finkel 1993).  This is especially true in high salience races that inundate 
voters with multiple messages.  For down ballot campaigns, however, where money and 
volunteer time are scarce resources, there are situations when a candidate is only able to reach a 
voter once during an election cycle.   This is especially true when a campaign relies on a 
doorstep politics strategy for contacting voters.  As such, that contact may be the only 
opportunity a voter has to be exposed to information about that candidate, or even the position 
for which the candidate is running.  
 Returning to the recency effect of the RAS model, information received closer to an 
election is easier for a voter to retrieve on Election Day (Zaller 1992).  When the information 
received is related to a low salience race, one for which a voter has limited information, that 
recent information may be the only information available when making a voting decision.  If 
voters rely heavily on shortcuts in high salience races, it shouldn’t be too much of a stretch to 
anticipate this same phenomenon taking place in a down ballot race, too.  In the absence of 
traditional heuristics like partisanship, voters are relegated to less precise shortcuts (Iyengar and 
Simon 2000).  The recognition of a name on a ballot sometimes is all that is needed for a voter to 
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make a voting decision.  After all, voters are reluctant to vote for an unfamiliar name (Sides, 
Shaw, Grossman and Lipsitz 2012). 
 
3.13 MOVING FORWARD 
 
The quest to identify who is most receptive to mobilization efforts presents us with an interesting 
challenge.   Prior studies have given us insight as to which modes of mobilization achieve the 
largest aggregate effect, and point to more personal contact as being the most effective.  The 
modes that fall into that category are what I like to call doorstep politics -- face-to-face 
canvassing and literature drops take the campaign to the voter’s doorstep.  Because the message 
is delivered by someone involved in the campaign (the candidate, volunteer or campaign worker) 
it is viewed as being more personal than messages delivered by a postal carrier, the mass media 
or a phone bank system (Gerber and Green 2001).  It also reduces the ability of the less 
politically engaged to opt out of being exposed to the mobilization message.  Not coincidentally, 
it is those forms of campaigning that are the least expensive, monetarily speaking, when 
conducted by volunteers.  As I pointed out earlier, the mode of contact that is most efficient with 
volunteer time and campaign money is leaflet distribution (Nickerson, Friedrichs and King 
2006).  As such, it is leafleting that is most readily available to even the most underfunded 
campaigns, and will be the mode of mobilization used for this project.  
In addition to the mode for delivering mobilization messages, there are a few other 
aspects of studying the effects of mobilization messages to consider.   Data collection, sample 
selection and campaign salience are on the list. 
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3.14 MODES OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
Survey Data: 
 Because the goal of this study is to capture the effect of mobilization efforts, the use of 
survey data may not be the preferred method.   Surveys rely on self-reporting of an individual on 
whether they were contacted by a campaign, and if they voted (e.g. Davenport, Gerber and Green 
2010).  Over reporting is often the result of social desirability and lapses in memory.  Making 
matters worse, it has been observed the problem of over reporting has been on the rise because of 
declining response rates (Burden 2000).  The external validity of survey studies, however, is 
desirable when seeking to generalize study findings to the population as a whole. 
 
Lab Experiments:  
 If capturing the cause and effect of a treatment, with a high level of certainty the results 
are accurate, is the goal, a lab experiment can be an option.  Like survey studies, however, it is 
important to consider both the strengths and weaknesses of studying a subject using this mode of 
data collection.  First, while a lab experiment provides strong internal validity, it is limited in its 
ability to generalize its findings to the population as a whole.    Chief among the barriers to 
external validity of lab experiments is the use of college students who are not representative of 
the general population (Sears 1986).  Additionally, the artificial ways outcomes are often 
measured in the lab also compromise generalizeability (Aronson, Wilson and Brewer 1998).  
Thus, the artificial setting of the lab often distances it from the actual phenomenon under 
investigation.  If it is desired to capture the cause and effect of a treatment, but still have the 
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ability to generalize the results to a larger population, both survey studies and lab experiments 
may not be the best choice. 
 
Field Experiments:  
 By defining what I hope to accomplish with this study, the best mode of data collection 
comes into focus.  Because I want to gain a better understanding of the effects of mobilization 
messages, it is necessary to conduct my experiments in a real-world setting.  Additionally, I want 
to have confidence my results will have both internal and external validity.  A field experiment is 
the mode of data collection that best facilitates those stated goals (e.g. Druckman, Green, 
Kuklinski and Lupia 2006).  There are four criteria, however, that need to be kept in mind while 
designing a field experiment to ensure it approximates real-world conditions.  The first is 
whether the stimulus used in the experiment resembles the stimuli that would be encountered in 
an actual campaign.  Second, whether the test subjects resemble the individuals who would 
normally be exposed to the stimuli.  Third, whether the context with which the test subjects 
receive the stimuli resembles the political context one would normally be in to receive the 
stimulus.  Finally, whether the measured outcomes resemble the actual outcomes in the real-
world for which I have theoretical and practical interest (Davenport, Gerber and Green 2010).  In 
chapter 5 I focus my attention on the second criteria; whether the test subjects resemble the 
individuals who would normally be exposed to the stimuli.  As I will explain, disregarding that 
criterion may introduce selection bias. 
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3.15 CAMPAIGN SALIENCE 
 
Finally, the campaign setting for measuring the effects of mobilization messages is an important 
consideration.  The vast majority of political campaigns in the United States can be classified as 
low budget and low salience affairs.  Campaigns for school board, city council, various advisory 
boards, judicial positions, and often state legislative races fall into the low budget/salience 
category.  If the majority of campaigns fall into that category, then it seems logical to study 
mobilization in that setting, especially when considering the fact, based on monetary costs, 
doorstep politics is the most universally available mode for mobilization voters.  Given low 
turnout levels in these low salience races, and amid limited campaigning and few newsworthy 
political events, it is a perfect setting to capture the effects of mobilization messages (e.g. 
Gosnell 1927; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003; Niven 2004).  Unlike high salience races 
where voters are inundated with campaign messages from well-funded state-wide and national 
campaigns, for municipal elections and other low salience campaigns, voters are faced with 
making voting decisions based on limited information.  This increases the learning costs 
associated with gathering the necessary information to assess each candidate, which is often too 
costly for the average voter (e.g. Aldrich 1995).  Thus, doorstep politics efforts in a municipal 
election provide voters with cost-cutting information for which the effects can more easily be 
captured. 
 In the next chapter I discuss the campaign setting for this project, and explore the 
literature on campaign and mobilization message effects in low salience elections.  Because this 
project utilizes data collected in a magisterial district judicial campaign, I also review what is 
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presently known about the effects of mobilization messages and campaign effects in judicial 
campaigns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41 
4.0 CAMPAIGN SETTING: JUDICIAL AND LOW SALIENCE CAMPAIGNS 
 
For this dissertation I will use data collected during a 2011 magisterial district judicial primary 
campaign in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  The office of Magisterial District Judge, a partisan 
elected office, was at the bottom of the ballot with the office of County Executive at the top of 
the ticket.  By any metric, this campaign would be classified as a low salience election.   No 
congressional or state-wide elective offices appeared on the ballot.  
The judicial district for this campaign included two city council wards comprising a total 
of 55 voting districts, and geographically encompassed 10 square miles.  The judicial district had 
25,958 registered Democrats and 5,577 registered Republicans .  According to state law, only 
registered Democrats and Republicans can participate in the closed primary system.  As such, 
only registered Democrats and Republicans are included in the data for this study.  All 55 voting 
districts used electronic voting machine which, as I will explain later, has implications when 
studying mobilization in low salience elections.   
Historically, the winner of the Democratic primary in this judicial district wins the 
general election.  As such, more resources are spent by campaigns seeking the Democratic 
nomination than is spent for the Republican nomination.  However, according to state law, 
judicial candidates are allowed to cross-file, or have their name appear on both the Democratic 
and Republican ballots.  Not all candidates take advantage of this opportunity.  The benefit of 
cross-filing is if a candidate is able to win both the Democratic and Republican primaries they 
will win the office, thus negating the need for a general election campaign.  The campaign for 
this study had four candidates on the Democratic ballot and three on the Republican ballot, with 
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three candidates appearing on both ballots.  Of the three cross-filed candidates, two were 
registered Democrats and one was a registered Republican.   
The candidates on the Democratic ballot each had distinct political and legal 
backgrounds.  One candidate was a 3 term city council member who was a registered paralegal.  
This candidate’s name only appeared on the Democratic ballot.  The other three candidates were 
cross-filed on the Republican ballot.  The first candidate was a practicing lawyer with eleven 
years of appointed judicial experience.  The second candidate was also a practicing lawyer who 
had never held elective office, but was active in the local Democratic Party.  The third candidate, 
also a practicing lawyer, had unsuccessfully run multiple times for Mayor as the Republican 
nominee.   
The data for this project were collected by volunteers working on one of the cross-filed 
candidates’ campaigns.  The specifics of each field experiment employed during the campaign 
will be outline in detail in each of the substantive methodological chapters that follow. The first 
experiment (Chapter 5) attempts to identify the selection bias introduced in a field experiment 
when strategic targeting of likely voters is disregarded when randomizing the population.  The 
second experiment (Chapter 6) focuses on identifying who in the electorate is most responsive to 
mobilization messages.  The third and final field experiment for this project delves into capturing 
the effects of mobilization messages on vote choice (Chapter 7).  Taken together, the three 
methodological chapters provide us with a better understanding of the effects of those three 
aspects of mobilization.  The analysis in each chapter is viewed through the lens of John Zaller’s 
Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model. 
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4.1 JUDICIAL AND LOW SALIENCE ELECTIONS 
 
Prior to diving into the methodological chapters of this project, it is first important to explore 
what is currently known about judicial campaigns and how the findings of this study contribute 
to the judicial literature, and may be extended to other low salience elections.   
 As the purpose of this project is to capture the effects of mobilization messages, and not 
the merits of judicial elections, I shelve the debate over whether judges should be appointed or 
elected.  Several thoughtful articles and books have been written on this topic for readers 
interested in the debate (e.g., Bonneau and Hall 2009; Dubois 1980; see also Baum 2003; De 
Muniz 2002).  The use of a Magisterial District Judicial campaign for this project was intended 
to facilitate capturing the effects of mobilization messages on voters in low salience elections.  
As such, the literature reviewed in the following sections focus on studies that have explored 
mobilization efforts in judicial campaigns and the unique challenges low salience campaigns face 
when attempting to get the attention of voters.  One of the key elements of the RAS model is 
receiving the message being tested.  Thus, understanding the steps taken to attract the attention 
of individuals in a down ballot low salience election is central to the current project. 
 
4.2 STUDYING JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 
 
The study of judicial campaigns offers many research opportunities.  Those opportunities 
primarily come from the fact there has been limited resources and time dedicated to studying 
elections for these powerful positions.  One of the key hurdles is the availability of data (Streb 
2007).  While the American National Election Study (ANES) provides data on presidential and 
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congressional elections, it offers little, if any, support for the study of the judicial branch of 
government.  For that reason, many scholars shift their attention to electoral competitions for 
which they can more easily gather data.  Other down ballot campaigns, like city council, school 
board, city planner, other city and county advisory board positions, and at times, state legislative 
races, also suffer from the dearth of data.   
 The one area of judicial elections that has been more thoroughly studied is that of state 
supreme courts.  The discussion of mobilization in that setting primarily centers on the effect of 
judicial campaigns on vote roll off (e.g., Hall 2007).  Vote roll off, defined as the difference in 
the number of votes cast in a down ballot contest compared to the total number of individuals 
who turned out to vote, has been used as a metric for capturing the effectiveness of judicial 
campaigns to garner the attention of voters.  The conclusion by many judicial election scholars is 
the larger the vote roll-off, the less effective a campaign was at elevating the salience of the 
judicial contest. 
 Once characterized as uninteresting and placid affairs (Dubois 1984), the competition for 
the high court of each state has increased in visibility.  Due in a large part to the influx of money, 
judicial campaigns have become more salient with the increased use of the media to campaign 
(Langer, Leonard and Polk 2010).  That money is a vehicle for candidates running for judge to 
provide voters with information (Bonneau 2007).  In the absence of that money, however, little if 
any information would be transmitted to voters.  Such is the case for other down ballot races, 
including local judicial races.  As such, much of what we know about voter mobilization and 
vote choice in judicial campaigns is limited to that of the state supreme courts.  As I covered 
earlier, the vast majority of elective offices in the United States fall into the low salience 
category.  Thus, it is other down ballot contests, like the one used for this project, that provide a 
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valuable setting to better understand political behavior by testing the importance of information 
and saliency to the American electorate (Langer, Leonard and Polk 2010). 
 
4.3 VOTE ROLL-OFF: EFFECT OF ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES 
 
Due to the fact prior judicial campaign studies have used vote-roll off as a measure for the 
effectiveness of a judicial campaign to mobilize voters (e.g., Hall 2007), it is necessary to discuss 
vote roll-off in the context of the present study.  Vote Roll-Off is the difference in the number of 
total votes cast in an election compared to the number of votes recorded for down ballot 
campaigns.  Those results are usually reported as a percentage.  Voter fatigue, ballot confusion, 
disinterest in down ballot campaigns, or a lack of political sophistication have all been pointed to 
as possible reasons for vote roll-off (e.g. Ansolabehere 2002; Nichols and Strizek 1995; Shocket, 
Heighberger and Brown 1992).  
 Due to the nature of the first experiment in this dissertation, which I explain in detail in 
Chapter 5, for which I randomized the entire registered voter population, the application of vote 
roll-off as a measure for the effectiveness of the treatment is not applicable.  Randomizing all 
registered voters, distributed across 55 voting districts, the average number of people exposed to 
the treatment in each voting district was less than 50.  Thus, using an aggregate measure like 
vote roll-off, when hundreds of people in each voting district turned out to vote who were not 
exposed to the treatment, will not effectively capture the effect of the mobilization message.   
There is an additional reason why vote roll-off may not be useful for the present study.  Namely, 
the type of voting equipment used for the election used in this dissertation greatly reduces vote 
roll-off.  The issue of vote roll-off is most pronounced in voting districts using outdated voting 
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equipment (Ansolabehere 2002).  The United States employs five types of voting technology: 
hand counted paper ballots, punch cards, optically scanned paper ballots, lever machines, and 
electronic voting machines.   The rate of vote roll-off has been directly linked to the technology 
used at a polling location.  Of the current voting technology employed in the United States, the 
use of electronic voting machines has been shown to experience the lowest rate of vote roll-off 
(Ansolabehere 2002; Nichols and Strizek 1995; Shocket, Heighberger and Brown 1992).  The 
reasons for the improved ballot completion rates credit the ease of use of electronic voting 
machines, the on screen instructions, and the automated reminders to finish voting for all offices 
on the ballot.  If a voter wants to submit their ballot before casting a vote in all contests displayed 
on the ballot, a warning comes on the screen notifying the voter that their ballot is not complete.  
The voter then has to acknowledge they intentionally left some of the positions blank before 
submitting the ballot.  Those prompts have been found to decrease, but not completely eliminate, 
the number of voters who do not complete their ballots.   The conclusion is vote roll-off, when an 
electronic voting machine is used, may not be the best measure for mobilization for a down 
ballot campaign, as the voting equipment reduces the amount of people who do not complete the 
entire ballot.  Additionally, due to the nature of the present study utilizing doorstep politics, the 
ability to disentangle the individuals who received the mobilization message from those who did 
not in the aggregate turnout numbers makes the use of vote roll-off tenable. As such, in the next 
chapter, I outline alternative methods to vote roll-off used by scholars to capture the effects of 
mobilization messages in a field experiment setting. 
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4.4 STUDYING LOW SALIENCE LOCAL ELECTIONS 
 
The challenges of data availability facing the study of judicial elections is amplified when 
looking at down-ballot local elections.  The absence of a readily available, centralized data 
repository for local elections has been pointed to as one of the primary reasons for the lack of 
scholarly interest in local elections (e.g. Caren 2007).  Scholars who want to study local elections 
are forced to expend extensive time to gather data from multiple locations that are unorganized 
(Marschall 2010), or implement their own field experiments to collect their own data.  The latter 
option was used for the data collection for the current project. 
Further contributing to the limits of local election literature is, instead of looking at 
turnout and vote choice at the local level, scholars have focused the majority of their attention on 
participatory acts associated with the provision and quality of local public services (Marschall 
2010).  One of the primary reasons identified for the focus on non-electoral forms of political 
behavior at the local level is the turnout rates for off-election year contests is rather small when 
compared to state-wide and federal elections (Verba et al. 1995).  This low turnout is then 
pointed to as a reason local races are low salience affairs, and thus, almost in a self-fulfilling 
prophesy, continue to fail to attract media attention.   
 Fortunately, the renewed interest in mobilization studies has focused on down ballot 
elections, and thus has helped provide the discipline with knowledge about voter behavior in 
local elections.  But we still have a lot to learn.  The good news is, this provides scholars 
studying local elections ample opportunity for scholarly inquiry.  With 87,525 local governments 
(US Census Bureau 2002), each with multiple elective offices, the discipline has a relatively 
unexplored area of inquiry (Marschall 2010). 
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 In the next chapter I outline the challenges associated with sample selection when 
studying mobilization at the local level.  Issues of selection bias and distancing oneself from the 
phenomenon of interest are discussed. 
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5.0 STUDYING VOTER MOBILIZATION: THE PITFALLS OF OMITTING ‘STRATEGY’ IN YOUR 
DESIGN 
 
The goal of a field experiment is to replicate the conditions of a real-world setting in order to 
study a phenomenon of interest (Davenport, Gerber and Green 2010).  Voter mobilization has 
been the primary beneficiary of the renewed interest in field experiments by political scientists as 
a mode of collecting data.  Some of the methods used in the sample population selection stage of 
a field experiment, however, may introduce selection bias.  Additionally, the inclusion of 
individuals who would normally be ignored by a political campaign (infrequent voters) in a 
mobilization study may inadvertently distance scholars from the phenomenon of interest.   
In this chapter, I explore the potential implications of sample selection when designing a 
mobilization field experiment.  Political campaigns are inherently strategic. From designing the 
message to identifying who to contact, political practitioners strategically allocate their limited 
resources of volunteer (and paid staff) time and money.  For that reason, it is necessary to 
understand the methods used by those practitioners when studying campaign activities.  This is 
true for the study of mobilization.  As I will explain in the sections that follow, ignoring the 
strategic nature of who campaigns choose to target for a mobilization drive may have 
implications when studying the effects of mobilization messages. 
Using two leafleting field experiments during a magisterial judicial campaign in a major 
U.S. city, I set out to test for the potential sample bias introduced when strategic targeting tactics 
used by political practitioners are omitted from a field experiment design.  The results of my 
study in this chapter indicate past voter mobilization studies, due to selection bias introduced 
during sample selection, have likely under reported the effects of mobilization efforts.  Thus, 
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within the Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model (Zaller 1992), identifying who in the electorate 
is most likely to receive mobilization messages is a necessary step in capturing the true effects.    
 Prior to getting into the substantive implications of sample selection for a field 
experiment, it is first necessary to review the potential shortcomings of various data collection 
methods. 
 
5.1 MODES OF DATA COLLECTION: POTENTIAL BIAS 
 
The renaissance of field experiments in political science has helped the discipline move past lab 
experiments and survey data, and allowed scholars to study phenomenon of interest in a natural 
setting.  Using this method of data collection helped advance our knowledge of which modes of 
mobilization are most effective (e.g., Cardy 2005; Gerber and Green 2003, 2001, 2000; Green 
and Gerber 2004), started to bring into focus who in the electorate is most responsive to 
mobilization messages (e.g., Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Niven 2004, 2001) and helped 
identify the conditions for which mobilization is most effective (e.g., Nickerson 2007; 
Panagopoulos 2009).  Like many pioneering paths of inquiry before it, however, the time has 
come to reevaluate the methods used to study voter mobilization, and to confirm the steps taken 
to capture the effects of mobilization truly facilitate the measurement of the phenomenon of 
interest.   
 One of the primary concerns of any academic inquiry is the introduction of bias by way 
of data collection.  Scholars relying on survey data must be cognizant of the potential pitfalls of 
social desirability, lapses in respondents’ memory, and the potential for intentionally deceptive 
answers.  Lab experiments introduce bias by virtue of the participant subject pool (Sears 1986), 
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use of artificial settings (Aronson, Wilson and Brewer 1998), and the Hawthorne effect .  While 
field experiments are seen by some as the best method to overcome many of the shortcomings of 
survey and lab studies, it is not exempt from the potential introduction of bias.  If the goal of a 
field study is to isolate the causal influence of an intervention while attempting to approximate 
the conditions under which a causal process occurs (Davenport, Gerber and Green 2010), we 
should ensure the methods used to implement a study mirror the phenomenon of interest. 
 A key component of field experiments is the use of random assignment.  The benefit of 
the random assignment of treatment and control groups is that the process eliminates systematic 
differences in the two groups, thus any differences that arise between the two groups can be 
attributed to the experimental treatment instead of any preexisting differences (e.g., Rubin 1974).  
It would appear the random assignment process of a field experiment eliminates the concern of 
selection bias.  Interestingly, it is this first step in a field experiment that may in fact be where 
selection bias is introduced, and thus will be the focus of this chapter.   
 
5.2 INTRODUCTION OF SELECTION BIAS: RANDOMIZATION 
 
There are elements of a field experiment that need to be kept in mind while designing a study.  
Violating one of these elements can potentially compromise the reliability of the results.  
Specifically, selection bias can be introduced when randomizing the sample population.  To 
facilitate my discussion, I will utilize the four criteria outlined by Davenport, Gerber and Green 
(2010) that need to be kept in mind while designing a field experiment to ensure it approximates 
real-world conditions.  The first criterion is whether the stimulus used in the experiment 
resembles the stimuli that would be encountered in an actual campaign.  Second, whether the test 
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subjects resemble the individuals who would normally be exposed to the stimuli.  Third, whether 
the context with which the test subjects receive the stimuli resembles the political context one 
would normally be in to receive the stimulus.  Finally, whether the measured outcomes resemble 
the actual outcomes in the real-world for which we have theoretical and practical interest 
(Davenport, Gerber and Green 2010).  It is the second criterion--whether the test subjects 
resemble the individuals who would normally be exposed to the stimuli—for which I will focus 
my attention for the analysis of selection bias in field experiments. 
The randomization step eliminates any bias that may have existed between the treatment 
and control groups. By way of selecting the population to be randomized, however, I contend is 
where selection bias may be introduced into a study.  In the context of studying voter 
mobilization, by including individuals in a study who would normally not be contacted by a 
political campaign, a researcher inadvertently introduces selection bias into a study.  This 
argument is predicated on the potential differences in behavior between individuals who would 
normally be targeted by a political campaign compared to those individuals a campaign will 
forego contacting.  If both groups have identical responses to mobilization messages, then no 
selection bias would be introduced by randomizing the entire voting population.  However, if 
individuals who would normally be targeted by a campaign, or those residing at an address that 
would be targeted by a campaign, respond differently than those who would be skipped by a 
campaign, then the amount of selection bias introduced by randomizing the entire voting 
population may be large.  Open for debate is the effect of the bias introduced when scholars omit 
strategy and randomize the entire voting population for a voter mobilization field experiment.   
To organize my discussion, I will first explore the extant political behavior literature to 
guide my thoughts on the effect of the potential selection bias introduced when individuals who 
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would normally be skipped by a political campaign are included in a mobilization field study. 
Again, if individuals who would normally be targeted by a political campaign behave the same 
as those individuals who would normally be skipped by a campaign, then the concerns about 
selection bias may be unnecessary.  As I will demonstrate, however, there are reasons to believe 
the two groups systematically behave differently, and therefore the population selection in the 
randomization step in a mobilization field study has far reaching implications.  Within the 
Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model, it is necessary to keep in mind who is most likely to 
receive a mobilization message in an actual political campaign.  As such, we must first 
understand how political practitioners identify which households to contact during a mobilization 
drive. 
 
5.3 PRACTITIONER VOTER TARGETING APPROACH 
 
Campaigns operate on limited resources of time and money (e.g. Grey 2007; Holbrook and 
McClurg 2005; Issenberg 2012).  The goal of each person running for elective office is to get 
elected (Mayhew 1974).  As such, with limited resources and a clear goal of being elected, 
political campaigns strategically target their scarce resources to areas they believe will provide 
the most return on investment (i.e. votes).  At the top of the list are individuals who are most 
likely to turnout to vote.  This is one topic where political scientists and campaign practitioners 
agree--- people who have voted in past elections are likely to vote again (e.g. Gerber, Green and 
Shachar 2003; Grey 2007).  For that reason, political campaigns often target households where a 
frequent voter, or someone with a track record of voting, resides.   
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 The analysis that follows explores the potential selection bias introduced into a 
mobilization study when the strategic targeting methods of campaign practitioners are not 
included.  This is not to say that prior studies which did not include strategic targeting when 
randomizing their treatment and control groups have not contributed to the study of mobilization.  
There is theoretical value in knowing the effect of mobilization messages if every registered 
voter had an equal probability of receiving a mobilization message.  That knowledge allows 
scholars to speculate what effect an increase in mobilization efforts would have on turning out 
the politically unengaged segments of the population.  The fact remains, however, not every 
registered voter has an equal probability of being targeted for mobilization by a political 
campaign.  As long as political campaigns are the ones conducting the bulk of mobilization 
activities, there is theoretical value in gaining a better understanding of the effects of 
mobilization messages in the current strategic political environment.  Thus, it is my intent to 
build on the prior studies that speculated on ‘what if’ with the effects of mobilization messages 
on ‘what is.’  In the next section I explore what the extant literature tells us about the possible 
effect of selection bias when studying the effects of mobilization messages. 
 
5.4 SELECTION BIAS: INCREASED OR DECREASED EFFECTS? 
 
Open for debate is the effect of including individuals in a mobilization field study who would 
normally be skipped by a political campaign.  On one hand, if the potential selection bias 
introduced by randomizing the entire population is consistent with the expectations of 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the inclusion of households comprised only of infrequent voters 
who would normally be skipped by a political campaign may artificially inflate the effects of a 
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mobilization study.  Because they anticipate that it is the least politically engaged segments of 
the population who are most receptive to mobilization messages, by including a disproportionate 
amount of those individuals in a study will inadvertently produce large aggregate effects.  Thus, 
if one controls for that selection bias, we may find the effects of prior mobilization studies wash 
out.  On the other hand, if Hillygus (2005) is correct that only the most politically active and 
attentive segments of the population respond to mobilization efforts, once we control for the 
potential selection bias introduced by including a disproportionate number of people who do not 
respond to mobilization efforts (i.e. infrequent voters), it may be discovered that prior studies of 
mobilization have underreported their effects. 
 The first step is to determine if randomizing the entire registered voting population 
introduces selection bias.  Thus, we need to figure out if individuals who would normally be 
targeted for mobilization by a political campaign respond differently than those individuals who 
would normally be ignored.  Once we resolve that first question, we can then focus on 
identifying the effect of including individuals who would normally be ignored in a mobilization 
study.  Without an understanding of that potential selection bias, we cannot be confident the 
results of a mobilization study can accurately capture the effects of mobilization messages.  As I 
have pointed out, the theoretical foundation for answering that question does not provide a 
consistent expectation.  Understanding the goals and strategies of political practitioners as well 
as understanding that political scientists and practitioners agree that past voting behavior is one 
of the best predictors of future voting behavior (e.g. Gerber, Green and Shachar 2003; Grey 
2007), the argument made by Hillygus (2005) appears to be the most logical.  
Thus, I anticipate the inclusion of people who would not normally be targeted for 
mobilization by a campaign (a household full of infrequent voters) in a mobilization study will 
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negatively affect the results of a mobilization study.  By including households that would 
normally be skipped by a political campaign, those full of infrequent voters, a researcher 
essentially waters down the results of a mobilization study.  As such, I hypothesize randomizing 
the entire population for a mobilization study, instead of randomizing voters who would 
normally be targeted by a political campaign, will negatively affect the results.  Formally stated:  
 
H1: Exposure to the mobilization treatment is associated with a greater propensity to 
turnout among citizens who are likely to be targeted strategically by campaigns. 
 
Now that I have identified the anticipated direction of selection bias introduced by 
omitting strategy in a voter mobilization study, it is necessary to decide the best way to test for 
that potential selection bias.  An obvious solution to this question would be to conduct two 
separate field experiments.  The first experiment should replicate the steps taken by prior 
mobilization studies that randomized the entire registered voter population.  The second field 
experiment would then randomize a population of voters who would normally be targeted by a 
political campaign.  As both treatment groups would be exposed to identical treatments, the only 
difference in the two field experiments will be the sample selection methods to randomize the 
same population of registered voters.  The first experiment will include individuals who would 
normally be skipped by a political campaign, and the second experiment will only include 
households, consistent with the targeting methods used by campaign practitioners (e.g. Grey 
2007; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Issenberg 2012), which would normally be targeted by a 
political campaign.  If H1 is correct, I can expect the aggregate effect of the second field 
experiment to be larger than the aggregate effect of the first experiment. 
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Using the data collected during the campaign outlined in chapter 4, the following sections 
detail the field experiments implemented to capture the effects of mobilization messages.   
 
5.5 NON-STRATEGIC DOOR HANGER EXPERIMENT 
 
For the first door hanger experiment I followed the randomization methods used by Green and 
Gerber (2004) to select voters .  Using the registered voter list provided by the local election 
board, all registered Democrats and Republicans had an equal probability of being selected for 
the study.  1000 Democrats and 500 Republicans were randomly selected to receive a door 
hanger the week leading up to the election .  Addresses that included apartment numbers were 
eliminated from the lists due to access restrictions.  Those access restrictions not only were 
barriers for the volunteers for this study, but they would also be barriers for other campaigns 
attempting to make doorstep contact with the individuals living at those addresses.  As such, 
eliminating individuals from a mobilization study who would not be accessible for any canvasser 
is justified (e.g. Green and Gerber 2004).   
After assigning every voter a random number, the 1000 Democrats and 500 Republicans 
with the highest random number were then added to a walking list.  A walking list is a list of 
addresses each volunteer carried with them to identify which houses were to receive a door 
hanger.  There were some duplicate addresses as more than one Democrat or Republican at a 
given address was randomly selected.  There were also some duplicate households that had a 
Republican AND a Democrat randomly selected residing at the same address (Split Party 
Household).  The total number of duplicate addresses was small enough to not negatively affect 
the N for the study.  The decision to select based on individual registered voters instead of 
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selecting based on street addresses is consistent with the selection methods used by Green and 
Gerber (2004).  Additionally, the advantage of individual-level randomization is that the design 
generates a great deal of statistical power (Arceneaux 2005).  Some addresses had multiple 
registered voters and others only one, so to truly gather a random sample, every registered voter 
was included on the list of potential voters to receive a door hanger.  Had I selected based on 
addresses, it would have biased the selection process toward households with only one registered 
voter.  As such, my sample gave every voter an equal chance of being selected.   
It is important to note that the randomized N for Democratic and Republican households 
was 1000 and 500 respectively, however, the total N for the treatment group was 3123.  As there 
is no way to control who at a given address received the treatment –which individuals at an 
address discovered the door hanger- all residents at an address are included in my treatment 
group.  Again, this is consistent with the steps taken in prior mobilization studies (e.g. Green and 
Gerber 2004).  Volunteers were instructed to place the door hanger on the door knob of the front 
door of each address on their list.  Volunteers did not knock on the doors and did not speak with 
voters for this experiment.  Addresses on the list that were vacant were noted on the walking lists 
and removed from the data.  A residence was classified as vacant if the volunteer was able to 
observe the house was void of furniture or personal belongings.      
 Republican, Democratic and Split Party Households (houses with a Democrat and a 
Republican) received the same door hanger.  The door hanger displayed a picture of the 
candidate, the campaign logo, a list of the candidates’ experience, and VOTE THIS TUESDAY 
in bold lettering. 
 The unit of analysis for this study is the individual registered voter that lived at a 
residence that received a door hanger.  As it is unknown which resident at a given address found 
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the door hanger, I am including all registered voters in this study who resided at an address that 
received a door hanger.  Again, this is consistent with prior mobilization studies. 
 For my control group, all remaining voters on the voter registry were randomly assigned 
to a control group of equal size to the treatment group.  For robustness, I created three different 
randomly selected control groups and ran a probit regression using each of the control groups 
with the treatment group.  The findings using all three control groups achieved consistent results. 
 
5.6 STRATEGIC DOOR HANGER EXPERIMENT 
 
For the strategic door hanger experiment, past voting history was used as the criteria for selecting 
the households that would receive the treatment.  All households where at least one individual 
resided who voted at least once prior to the election under consideration were included.  
Admittedly, this is not as stringent of a selection criterion that most political practitioners would 
use for selecting which households to contact.  Due to the relative low cost of time for this mode 
of contact, however, campaigns often include a larger swath of the voting population when 
conducting a literature drop compared to when conducting face-to-face canvassing (e.g. Grey 
2007; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Issenberg 2012).   It also facilitates the ability to capture the 
effect of randomizing the entire registered voter population on a mobilization study compared to 
using a strategically targeted sample.  The sample included both Democratic and Republican 
households.  Consistent with the steps taken by campaign practitioners and as outlined by 
Arceneaux (2005), the randomization for this experiment was conducted at the voting district 
level.  
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Due to the volunteer pool for this experiment, primarily composed of junior and senior 
high school students who did not have access to a car, considerations had to be made regarding 
the distance from the staging point for the campaign activity to the voting districts where the 
literature (door hangers) would be distributed.  As such, a map of the judicial district was 
physically laid out on a table and a circle was drawn with roughly a one mile radius from the 
central staging point.  Thus, the farthest each volunteer would have to walk to get to their 
distribution point was roughly one mile.  The treatment group had an N=3123 and the control 
group had an N=8206 . 
As with the first experiment, volunteers were given walking lists with the addresses of 
houses to deliver a door hanger.  Because campaigns are interested in contacting likely voters 
(Grey 2007) during a mobilization drive, and past voting behavior has been demonstrated to be 
the best predictor of future voting behavior (Gerber, Green and Shachar 2003), all households 
with only non-voters were removed from the lists.  The control group consists of households in 
voting districts that did not receive the door hanger treatment and that have a registered 
Democrat and/or Republican living at that address who voted in at least one election prior to the 
election under consideration for this study.  
Identical to the first experiment, volunteers were instructed to place a door hanger on the 
front door.  This was strictly a literature drop.  No personal contact was made by a volunteer with 
a voter.  
A randomization check using past voting histories  for the treatment and control groups 
was conducted, and no statistically difference was found between the groups prior to conducting 
the experiments.  Randomization checks for each experiment in this project are displayed in the 
Appendix.  That extra step provided me with confirmation prior to conducting the field 
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experiments that I achieved comparable treatment and control groups.  The inclusion of past 
voting behavior in a probit regression, however, will account for the influence of past voting 
behavior on the effectiveness of the treatment, and thus will account for any disparities between 
the treatment and control groups had they existed.   
 
5.7 VOTE ROLL-OFF: EFFECT OF ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES 
 
Prior to proceeding to the results section, I want to address the issue of vote-roll off.  Due to the 
fact prior judicial campaign studies have used vote roll-off as a measure for the effectiveness of a 
judicial campaign to mobilize voters (e.g., Hall 2007), it is necessary to discuss vote roll-off in 
the context of the present study.  Vote roll-off is the difference in the number of total votes cast 
in an election for the top of the ticket contest compared to the number of votes recorded for down 
ballot campaigns.  Those results are usually reported as a percentage.  Voter fatigue, ballot 
confusion, disinterest in down ballot campaigns, or a lack of political sophistication have all been 
pointed to as possible reasons for vote roll-off. 
The issue of vote roll-off is most pronounced in voting districts using outdated voting 
equipment (Ansolabehere 2002).  The United States employs five types of voting technology: 
hand counted paper ballots, punch cards, optically scanned paper ballots, lever machines, and 
electronic voting machines.   The rate of vote-roll off has been directly linked to the technology 
used at a polling location.  Of the current voting technologies employed in the United States, the 
use of electronic voting machines has been shown to result in the lowest rate of vote roll-off 
(Ansolabehere 2002; Nichols and Strizek 1995; Shocket, Heighberger and Brown 1992).  The 
ease of use of electronic voting machines, the on screen instructions, and the automated 
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reminders to finish voting for all offices on the ballot is credited for the improved ballot 
completion rates.  If a voter wants to submit their ballot before casting a vote in all races 
displayed on the ballot, a warning comes on the screen notifying the voter that their ballot is not 
complete.  The voter then has to acknowledge they intentionally left some of the positions blank 
before submitting the ballot.  Those prompts have been found to decrease, but not completely 
eliminate, the number of voters who do not complete their ballots.   The conclusion is vote roll-
off, when an electronic voting machine is used, may not be the best measure for the effect of 
mobilization messages for a down ballot campaign, as the voting equipment reduces the amount 
of people who do not complete the entire ballot.  
All of the polling locations for the present study used electronic voting machines.  As 
such, the use of vote roll-off as a measure for the effect of mobilization messages may not be the 
best option .  It is also inconsistent with the methods used to measure the effects of mobilization 
messages by scholars studying mobilization (see all cited mobilization studies in this 
dissertation).  Due to the nature of the present study’s focus on capturing the effects of exposure 
to a mobilization message, and the fact not all registered voters received the treatment, the use of 
aggregate vote roll-off is not theoretically justified.  In the RAS model, the first assumption is an 
individual received the message.  Because a message can have no effect if not received, using 
aggregate vote roll-off, which includes voters who did not receive the mobilization message, 
does not accurately capture the effect of the treatment. As such, utilizing individual turnout data 
will be used for this project to test for the effect of receiving a mobilization message. 
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5.8 RESULTS: NON-STRATEGIC VS. STRATEGIC DOOR HANGER EXPERIMENTS 
 
To analyze my data I used a probit regression analysis, controlling for past voting behavior and 
partisanship, to capture the effect of the treatment.  As the population for this study was identical 
for each experiment, and the only difference was the randomization steps taken to select the 
treatment and control groups from the full population, I ran one probit regression sorted by each 
experiment regressing turnout on the experimental treatment for each experiment. Table 4-1 
shows the results of the probit regression analysis.  The probit coefficients were converted to 
changes in predicted probabilities using Scott Long's method for conversion (Long and Freese 
2003).  The results are reported as two-tailed tests. 
 
TABLE	  5-­‐1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Non-­‐Strategic	  Experiment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Strategic	  Experiment	  
	   	  	  	  	  b	   Robust	  Standard	  
Errors	  
b	   Robust	  Standard	  
Errors	  
Received	  Door	  Hanger	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.72	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .0111	  	   5.10	   .0107***	  
Lifetime	  Voting	  History	   	  	  	  	  	  45.65	   .0003***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55.99	   .0003***	  
Partisanship	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.52	   .0125***	   4.55	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .0123***	  
	   Note:	  ***p<.001,	  **p<.01	  	  
N=7428	  
Pseudo	  R2=0.264	  
Note:	  ***p<.001,	  **p<.01	  	  
N=11329	  
Pseudo	  R2=0.259	  
	  
 
Comparing the coefficients for the treatment groups from both experiments, an apparent 
difference can be seen.  In the experiment where the entire registered voter population was 
randomized for the treatment and control groups, the treatment coefficient (0.72) does not 
achieve statistical significance.  The treatment coefficient in the field experiment that 
randomized a strategically targeted population for the treatment and control groups has a larger 
magnitude (5.10) and is statistically significant.  Those findings appear to support my hypothesis 
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that a larger effect will be observed in the strategically targeted population.  Keeping in mind the 
only difference between the two experiments is the sample selection from the same population, it 
appears the inclusion of individuals who would normally be ignored by a political campaign in a 
mobilization study artificially reduces the effects of the treatment.  In other words, past studies 
which randomized the entire registered voting population likely have underreported the effects of 
mobilization messages.  
 Consistent with mobilization theory, past voting behavior for both experiments had 
statistically significant effects on the probability of turning out to vote, as did partisanship.  Even 
after controlling for those key contributors to the probability of voting, receiving a door hanger 
in a low salience race within the strategically targeted populations increased the probability of 
turning out to vote by more than 5%. 
 An eyeball examination indicates there is a difference in treatment effects between the 
strategic and nonstrategic experiments.  To test the difference between the increases in effect on 
turnout, I followed the steps outlined by Garfield (1984) to compare regression coefficients 
between two groups.  I can compare the regression coefficients of Turnout for the strategic 
experiment with the effect of the treatment in the nonstrategic experiment to test the null 
hypothesis Ho: Bnonstrat = Bstrat, where Bnonstrat is the regression coefficient for the 
nonstrategic experiment, and Bstrat is the regression coefficient for the strategic experiment. To 
do this analysis, I first made a dummy variable for the Strategic Experiment, and an interaction 
variable that was the product of Strategic Experiment and Treatment.  Table 5-2 displays the 
results from regressing the treatment, Strategic Experiment and the interaction term on turnout, 
controlling for voting history and partisanship. 
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TABLE	  5-­‐2	  
Testing	  the	  Difference	  in	  Treatment	  Effect	  Between	  the	  Non-­‐Strategic	  and	  Strategic	  Populations	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  b	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  t	   Standard	  Errors	  
Received	  Door	  Hanger	  
Strategic	  Population	  
Treatment*StratPop	  
Lifetime	  Vote	  History	  
Partisanship	  
	  0.012	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.63	  
	  0.009	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.11	  
	  0.036	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.97	  
	  0.015	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94.41	  
	  0.056	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .009	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .007	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .012***	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .000***	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .007***	  
-­‐cons	   	  0.009	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.09	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .008	  
Note:	  ***p<.001,	  **p<.01	  and	  *p<.05	  
N=18757	  
R2=0.3159	  
 
Interpreting the results, the Interaction Term tests the null hypothesis Ho: Bnonstrat = 
Bstrat, or the treatment effects in the nonstrategic experiment is statistically equal to the 
treatment effect in the strategic experiment. It is the t value, not the coefficient, which is used to 
assess the significance between two groups.  The t value for the Treatment*StratPop variable is 
2.97 and is significant, indicating that the regression coefficient Bstrat is significantly different 
from Bnonstrat.  The positive t value indicates the slope for the effect of the treatment increases 
in the strategic door hanger experiment.  Thus, comparing the two experiments, the effect of the 
door hanger on the probability to turnout in the strategic experiment is larger than the effect of 
the door hanger in the nonstrategic experiment.  Based on those findings, I can reject the null that 
the effect of the door hangers on individuals in the nonstrategic experiment is the same as the 
effect on the individuals in the strategic experiment. 
 
5.9 DISCUSSION 
 
The basic finding of this chapter indicates the effect of selection bias introduced when 
individuals who would normally be skipped by a political campaign are included in a 
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mobilization study has more than trivial implications.  Not only do these results draw into 
question the findings of prior mobilization studies that randomized the entire voting population, 
with the results of those prior studies likely under-reporting the effects of mobilization messages, 
it also provides support for the application of John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) 
model to the study of mobilization.  Understanding who is likely to receive a message is the first 
step in understanding the effects of a mobilization message.  
Future studies can test to see if the selection bias introduced by randomizing the entire 
voting population is consistent across other modes of mobilization.  Because this project was 
conducted in an urban setting, replicating my experiments in a rural and suburban setting is 
called for.  Finally, due to the low salience nature of the campaign used for this study, testing the 
effects of a strategic mobilization study in a more salient election would contribute to the 
generalizeability of these effects. 
With those limitations, however, this chapter provides a solid foundation for moving 
forward with the goal of identifying who in the electorate, based on voting propensities, is 
responsive to mobilization messages.  Demonstrating the dangers of including individuals in a 
mobilization study who would not normally be contacted during a mobilization drive is an 
important first step in the quest to identify who is responsive to mobilization messages.  
Including a sample of individuals who not only are not likely to be contacted by a political 
campaign, but also are less responsive to mobilization messages, would introduce selection bias 
in a study attempting to capture who, based on past voting behavior, is affected by mobilization 
messages. Thus, utilizing a randomly selected population of individuals who would likely be 
contacted by a campaign will provide us with a more accurate picture of who in the electorate is 
responsive to mobilization messages.   
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 The key take away point from this chapter is that scholars need to be aware of the 
potential selection bias introduced in a voter mobilization study when campaign strategy is 
omitted from the design.   If the goal is to gain a better understanding of the effects of 
mobilization messages in an actual campaign setting, the steps taken when selecting the 
individuals to include in the treatment and control groups has implications for the reliability of 
the study results.  By including individuals in an experiment who would not normally be 
contacted by a campaign, a scholar is potentially distancing herself from the phenomenon of 
interest, therefore ignoring strategy when studying a topic that is inherently strategic may 
weaken the results.  Thus, from the RAS model perspective, it is necessary to understand who in 
the electorate is likely to receive a mobilization message.  From there, we can better understand 
who will accept, and then sample from, the mobilization message. 
 In the next chapter I attempt to identify who in the electorate, based on past voting 
behavior, is responsive to mobilization messages. 
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6.0 WHO IS MOBILIZEABLE?: THE EFFECTS OF MOBILIZATION MESSAGES ON FREQUENT, 
INTERMITTENT AND INFREQUENT VOTERS 
 
In the prior chapter, I set out to test the potential selection bias introduced in a mobilization study 
when including individuals who would normally be ignored by a political campaign.  The results 
indicate the inclusion of households with no frequent voters residing at an address, the criterion 
most readily used by political practitioners to target households (e.g., Grey 2007; Holbrook and 
McClurg 2005; Issenberg 2012), appears to water down the results of a mobilization study.  
Thus, randomizing the entire registered voter population, essentially including individuals who 
would normally be ignored by a political campaign, may not give an accurate picture of the 
effects of mobilization messages when a political campaign conducts a mobilization drive.  
 In the aggregate, it appears the debate over who in the electorate is responsive to 
mobilization messages has been resolved.  After all, it was the households which had an 
individual who voted in the past residing at the address that experienced the increase in the 
probability to turnout to vote when receiving the mobilization message.  That conclusion, 
however, would not be completely accurate. The aggregate numbers only tell us that households 
without an individual who had voted in the past are less likely to be affected by mobilization 
messages compared to households with a person who developed the habit of voting.  This may 
be a disappointing finding for democratic theorists who hoped an increase in mobilization efforts 
would reach the infrequent voting population.  It is, however, theoretically consistent with the 
Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model (Zaller 1992) within the mobilization field experiment 
context.  Those houses without a voter residing at the address would likely not receive a 
mobilization message in the first place. 
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 Within the television media environment of the RAS model, the media consumption 
habits and political sophistication of each individual play roles in the likelihood someone will 
receive political information, accept that information, and then use the information (sample) 
when forming political attitudes or opinions. The same is true within the mobilization field 
experiment context.  As I pointed out in the previous chapters, the winnowing technique most 
readily available to political practitioners when strategically targeting individuals for a 
mobilization drive is past voting behavior.  Thus, past voting behavior affects the probability an 
individual will receive a mobilization message.  Additionally, past voting behavior may be a 
proxy for political awareness, as individuals who have not developed the habit of voting may 
actively insulate themselves from exposure to the political information (Gerber, Green and 
Shachar 2003).  Thus, individuals who would normally be ignored by a political campaign---
people who normally will not receive mobilization messages---have characteristics that 
contribute to the way they respond (or don’t respond) to those messages when exposed.  Still 
unresolved, however, is the effect of the mobilization messages on each individual residing at a 
strategically targeted household.   After all, not everyone living at each address has identical 
voting propensities.  It is likely that frequent voters live with infrequent and intermittent voters, 
thus providing the opportunity to test the effects of mobilization messages on people with 
different propensities to vote within a strategically targeted sample. 
 The first step in the RAS model is identifying who will receive a message (Zaller 1992).  
The key criterion for implementing a field experiment is ensuring that the individuals included in 
the experiment resemble the individuals who would normally come in contact with the stimuli of 
interest (Davenport, Gerber and Green 2010).  Understanding who is most likely to receive a 
mobilization message is paramount in gaining a better understanding of who is responsive to 
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mobilization messages. As such, this chapter takes a closer look at the individuals residing at 
households strategically targeted by political practitioners for mobilization efforts.  Within those 
households there is variation in the past voting behaviors of each individual.  Some households 
have more than one frequent voter, while others have a frequent voter living with someone who 
has never voted in the past.  That variation affords the ability to test for the effects of 
mobilization messages on individuals with different propensities to vote. 
 
6.1 IDENTIFYING WHO IS MOST RESPONSIVE TO MOBILIZATION MESSAGES IN A 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
To set up my discussion, I first need to explore the findings of prior studies that have looked at 
which individuals in the electorate are responsive to mobilization messages.  It is this brief 
review that brings into focus the need to resolve the debate.  
The first wave of research identifying who is mobilizeable focused on the extremes of 
voter propensity.  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argued it should be the least likely to vote that 
will be most responsive.  After all, frequent voters are already going to vote, thus a mobilization 
message will have no effect.  It is the voters who have the lowest propensities to vote who can be 
most swayed by mobilization efforts.  These voters have very limited political information, 
undeveloped political opinions, and thus are more malleable to persuasive communication.  At 
the other extreme, Hillygus (2005) concluded that frequent voters are most likely to respond to 
mobilization messages.  The rationale is, frequent voters are most attentive to campaign activities 
and thus will be most likely to pay attention to mobilization messages.   
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Taking a different approach, studies have explored the effects on voters with medium 
propensities to vote, known as intermittent voters.  Following the logic of John Zaller (1992), 
Niven (2001, 2004) posited that frequent voters, who are most attentive and informed, are not 
likely to be swayed by mobilization messages.  At the other extreme, infrequent voters are 
disinterested and uninformed, thus these individuals avoid exposure to mobilization messages.  If 
a message is not received, he concludes, there can be no effect.  For that reason, Niven 
hypothesized, and demonstrated, voters in the mid-range of voter propensity are the most 
responsive to mobilization messages. 
Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) take a slightly different approach and conclude the 
effectiveness of a mobilization message is conditional on the salience of a political campaign.  
Their argument rests on an assumption that the tipping point for an individual voter to go from 
not voting in an election to committing to cast a ballot is not static.  Instead, the probability of an 
individual voter casting a ballot on Election Day is conditioned on the salience of a campaign. 
The more salient races, often better funded and more publicized, gain the attention of frequent 
and intermittent voters, and even enter into the consciousness of infrequent voters.  The high 
saliency of that race will lower the threshold for persuading voters to participate.  For that 
reason, Arceneaux and Nickerson argued that it will be infrequent voters who will be most 
affected by a mobilization drive, as the onslaught of campaign activity is difficult to avoid.  
Frequent and intermittent voters likely already intend to vote.  Therefore, it is voters with lower 
propensities to vote who may need extra encouragement to go to the polls.  A mobilization drive 
may provide that additional push.  Conversely, in low salience races, campaigns where there is 
no high profile race and limited advertising, only the most attentive voters will be aware that a 
campaign is underway.  As such, mobilization messages will have little to no effect on 
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intermittent and infrequent voters.  For frequent voters, however, all they may need is a reminder 
of the date of the election.  Thus, a mobilization drive will prompt frequent voters to head to the 
polls.  Finally, continuing with their model, mobilization messages in medium salience races, 
like those involving the election of a mayor, will be most effective with voters with mid-range 
propensities to vote.    
Each of the prior studies has contributed to the extant literature on mobilization.  
Unresolved, however, is who in the electorate is mobilizeable.  If it is conditioned on the level of 
attention an individual focuses on politics, then we would assume only the most attentive voters 
will respond to mobilization messages (e.g. Hillygus 2005) in the present study.  If the most 
attentive segment of the population is already likely to vote, and it is the least attentive who need 
the most encouragement, then we would assume the least attentive are most responsive to 
mobilization messages (e.g. Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  If Zaller (1992) is correct, as applied 
by Niven (2001, 2004) and the individuals at each extreme of voter propensities have already 
decided to vote or are unreachable, then the voters with medium propensities to vote will be most 
responsive.  Finally, if the key condition for identifying who in the electorate is most 
mobilizeable is the salience of an election, we would conclude that the only time mobilization 
successfully reaches infrequent voters is during the most salient campaigns, like a presidential 
election cycle (e.g. Arceneaux and Nickerson 2005).  Thus, depending on the salience of the 
race, the findings of Hillygus (2005), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), and Niven (2001, 2004) 
may support Arceneaux and Nickerson’s (2005) conditional model.  The limitation of those 
conclusions, however, is the consideration of who is most likely to receive a mobilization 
message.  As such, I turn my attention to the RAS model to help guide my efforts to better 
understand who is responsive to mobilization messages. 
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6.2 THE EFFECT OF EXPOSURE: THE RECEIVE STEP IN THE RAS MODEL 
 
The prior studies, while informative, may be misleading when identifying who in the electorate 
is most affected by mobilization messages.  First, applying the logic outlined by Zaller (1992), 
the key to persuasion is exposure to media messages .   When an inattentive voter wants to avoid 
exposure to political messages on TV, they simply have to change the channel.  The same can be 
said for avoiding newspapers, internet articles, and political information on the radio.  It becomes 
more difficult, however, to avoid political messages when those messages are delivered to your 
doorstep by a campaign volunteer (e.g. Gerber and Green 2001).   Thus doorstep politics reduces 
the ability to ‘opt out’ of exposure to mobilization messages.  It is important, however, to also 
keep in mind who is most likely to receive mobilization messages.   
As I outlined in chapter 2, applying the RAS model to the study of mobilization, we must 
first acknowledge the necessity to receive a message for it to have an effect, and then to 
understand who is likely to receive the message.  In chapter 5 I demonstrated that individuals 
residing in households that would normally be ignored by political campaigns during a 
mobilization drive are less responsive than those residing in a strategically targeted household.  
This would appear to support the conclusion that infrequent voters are less responsive to 
mobilization messages.  The problem with that conclusion, however, is the fact infrequent voters 
also reside in strategically targeted households.  The presence of at least one frequent voter 
increases the probability everyone residing at an address will receive a mobilization message.  
As such, exploring the effect of mobilization messages on individuals with different voting 
histories can be facilitated by conducting a study with strategically targeted households. 
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Prior studies have found a link between the political behavior of people residing at the 
same address (e.g. Nickerson 2008).  That finding suggests a mechanism by which civic 
participation norms are adopted by family members and possibly roommates.  This may 
contribute to the effect of mobilization messages on infrequent voters residing at an address that 
is strategically targeted during a mobilization drive.  Still unresolved is whether a frequent, 
intermittent or infrequent voter at a targeted household will be responsive to a mobilization 
message.  Applying Zaller’s (1992) RAS model to the discussion offers some guidance as to who 
we can anticipate will respond to mobilization messages. 
In the media setting, where individuals opt in or out of exposure to media messages, 
Zaller found that individuals with mid-levels of political awareness and interest were most 
affected by media messages.  Their limited knowledge was credited for the ability for the 
messages to have an effect.  More importantly, however, for the present study was the 
probability those individuals would receive the messages.  Thus, a combination of limited 
information and the probability of receiving the message set the stage for an effect.  Applying 
that logic to the study of mobilization, if limited information and the likelihood of exposure to a 
mobilization message is key, we could conclude that not only individuals with mid-levels of 
political interest and past political involvement will experience an effect.  We can also anticipate 
those individuals at the bottom of knowledge and participation will also respond.  I anticipate it 
will be individuals with limited information and political knowledge, but who have a high 
probability of receiving a mobilization message, who will be most responsive.  As I discuss in 
the next section, by taking the campaign to the doorsteps of voters, a mobilization message 
greatly cuts the costs associated with information gathering.  As such, I hypothesize mobilization 
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messages will have an effect on voters who have lower propensities to vote, in addition to those 
with mid-level propensities to vote.  Formally stated: 
 
H1: Exposure to the mobilization treatment is associated with a greater propensity to 
turnout among citizens who do not vote regularly or vote intermittently. 
 
6.3 VOTER PROPENSITY: DEFINING FREQUENT, INTERMITTENT AND INFREQUENT VOTERS 
 
Prior to outlining how I intend to test for the effects of mobilization messages on voters with 
different propensities to vote, I need to define the three voter propensity categories I will use for 
this study.  Following the steps outlined by Niven (2001, 2004), I will sort each individual into 
three different groups based on past voting behavior in the three election cycles prior to the 
election under consideration for this chapter.  Those three election cycles include a gubernatorial 
and U.S Senate general election, a contested gubernatorial primary election, and a municipal 
election with the office of Mayor at the top of the ticket.  These three election cycles will provide 
the necessary variance in voting behavior to categorize voters into three groups .    
The first group is Frequent Voters.  To be a frequent voter an individual must have voted 
in all three prior elections.  Intermittent Voters are those who turned out for two of the elections, 
while Infrequent Voters only voted in one or less of the three elections.  For parsimony, Niven 
(2001, 2004) combined individuals who voted once with those who did not vote at all.  It is this 
third category of voter propensity that is of primary interest for the current project. 
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6.4 DATA: IDENTIFYING WHO IS RESPONSIVE TO MOBILIZATION MESSAGES 
 
To test for the effects of mobilization messages on individuals with different voting propensities, 
I utilize the door hanger experiments from Chapter 5.  Using the same experiments provides a 
nice continuity for the theoretical story I am telling in this project.  By first establishing the need 
to include strategy when studying mobilization, we are one step closer to being able to more 
accurately identify who in the electorate, based on past voting behavior, is responsive to 
mobilization messages.  Applying the RAS model, the first step is understanding who is most 
likely to receive the mobilization message.  Consistent with the strategic targeting methods 
employed by campaign practitioners, as I discussed in detail in Chapter 5, past voting behavior is 
the most readily available information to assist in strategic targeting efforts.  Building on those 
earlier findings, I now explore the effect of mobilization messages on individuals with different 
propensities to vote. 
Once again, I will use both field experiments.  The first experiment, which randomized 
the entire registered voter population for its treatment and control groups, replicates the steps 
taken in prior mobilization studies. The findings from that experiment will provide a baseline 
comparison for my second experiment, which employed strategic targeting methods to identify 
the population of registered voters to randomly assign to treatment and control groups.  This 
second experiment provides a more realistic setting for studying the effects of mobilization 
messages on individuals with different voting propensities.  Those who received the mobilization 
message in the second experiment resemble the individuals who would normally be contacted by 
a campaign during a mobilization drive.  This puts me in a better position to identify who is 
responsive to mobilization messages during an actual mobilization drive.  
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Replicating the steps taken by Niven (2001, 2004), I used the voting history of each 
individual in the two experiments to divide the population into the three voter propensity 
categories.  By using the three election cycles prior to the election under consideration for this 
project, I am able to capture the variation between individuals in their propensity to vote.  This 
also provides a better measure for recent voting behavior when compared to a composite voting 
history score which consists of a raw number from the lifetime turnout rates of each individual 
(Green and Gerber 2004).  Using the composite score would inevitably bias the study toward 
those individuals who have lived in the area longer, or simply lived longer.  By using the past 
three election cycles, the data will capture the voting behavior of all age groups, and will include 
individuals who recently moved into the area (e.g. Niven 2004) 
 
6.5 RESULTS: NON-STRATEGIC DOOR HANGER EXPERIMENT 
 
To analyze my data I used a probit regression analysis, controlling for voting history and 
partisanship, to capture the effect of the treatment sorted by each individual’s propensity to vote.  
Table 6-1 shows the results of the probit regression analysis regressing turnout on the 
experimental treatment for the first door hanger experiment which randomized the entire 
registered voter population to select the treatment and control groups.  The probit coefficients 
were converted to changes in predicted probabilities, using Scott Long's method for conversion 
(Long and Freese 2003). 
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TABLE	  6-­‐1	  
Probit	  Regression	  of	  Voter	  Turnout	  on	  Mobilization	  Treatment	  (Non-­‐Strategic)	  
	   Infrequent	  
Voters	  
dy/dx	  (z)	  
Intermittent	  
Voters	  
dy/dx	  (z)	  
Frequent	  Voters	  
dy/dx	  (z)	  
Treatment	   	  	  0.69	  (.008)	   	  	  	  2.14	  (.031)*	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.21	  (.021)	  
Lifetime	  Vote	  History	   12.49	  (.000)***	   	  	  	  7.76	  (.001)***	   11.15	  (.001)***	  
PID	  	   	  	  2.01	  (.008)*	   	  	  	  3.78	  (.037)***	   	  3.94	  (.031)***	  
N	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  4732	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1126	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1570	  
Note:	  ***p<.001,	  **	  p<.01	  and	  *p<.05	  
Two-­‐Tailed	  tests	  
	  
 
Of the three voter propensity categories, the only one that achieves statistical significance 
is Intermittent Voters.  While the aggregate effect of the treatment after controlling for Lifetime 
Voting History and PID is relatively small (2.14%) it is statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence interval.   
Putting the results from Table 6-1 into context with prior mobilization studies, the results 
are consistent with prior findings.  Specifically, the studies that have explored who in the 
electorate are responsive to mobilization messages have concluded it is those individuals who 
fall in the mid-range (Intermittent) of voting propensities who will experience an effect (e.g. 
Niven 2001, 2004).  It is important to remember that those studies randomized the entire 
registered voter population to conduct their studies, which is the same process I used to identify 
my treatment and control groups for this experiment.  As I will demonstrate in the next section, 
and discussed in detail in chapter 5, the inclusion of individuals who would normally be ignored 
by a political campaign distorts the findings of a mobilization study attempting to identify who is 
responsive to mobilization messages.     
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6.6 RESULTS: STRATEGIC DOOR HANGER EXPERIMENT 
 
Repeating the steps outline above, I used a probit regression analysis to capture the effect of the 
treatment on each propensity to vote category within a strategically targeted population.  Table 
6-2 shows the results of the probit regression analysis regressing turnout on the experimental 
treatment for the second door hanger experiment which randomized a strategically targeted 
population of voters who would normally be contacted by a political campaign.  From that 
population I randomized my treatment and control groups.  Once again, the probit coefficients 
were converted to changes in predicted probabilities, using Scott Long's method for conversion 
(Long and Freese 2003).   
 
TABLE	  6-­‐2	  
Probit	  Regression	  of	  Voter	  Turnout	  on	  Mobilization	  Treatment	  (Strategic)	  
	   Infrequent	  
Voters	  
dy/dx	  (z)	  
Intermittent	  
Voters	  
dy/dx	  (z)	  
Frequent	  Voters	  
dy/dx	  (z)	  
Treatment	   	  	  3.82	  (.008)***	   	  	  	  	  	  3.76	  (.026)***	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.88	  (.017)**	  
Lifetime	  Vote	  History	   16.71	  (.000)***	   	  	  	  11.57	  (.001)***	   13.73	  (.001)***	  
PID	  	   	  	  0.04	  (.009)	   	  	  	  	  	  1.53	  (.036)	   	  4.00	  (.030)***	  
N	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  7009	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1835	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2485	  
Note:	  ***p<.001,	  **	  p<.01	  and	  *p<.05	  
Two-­‐Tailed	  tests	  
	  
 
It can be observed in Table 6-2 the treatment had a positive effect on all three categories.  
Unlike the non-strategic door hanger experiment where only Intermittent Voters experienced a 
statistically significant increase in their probability of turning out, in the strategic door hanger 
experiment Infrequent and Frequent voters also experienced an effect.  In the order of the size of 
the coefficients, the largest is Infrequent Voters (3.82) followed closely by Intermittent Voters 
(3.76), with the Frequent Voter category (2.88) in third place.  
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 Comparing Tables 6-1 and 6-2, it can be observed there was a large increase between the 
strategic and non-strategic door hanger experiments by the Infrequent Voter category.  A jump 
from statistically insignificant results (.69) to statistically significant results (3.82) constitutes an 
impressive shift.  It also appears to support my hypothesis that including individuals who would 
normally be ignored by a political campaign in a mobilization study will affect the results of a 
mobilization study attempting to capture who is responsive to mobilization messages.  Thus, 
prior conclusions that Infrequent Voters are not responsive to mobilization messages may be an 
artifact of the selection bias introduced in a study when randomizing the entire registered voter 
population.   
 It is also interesting to note that the Frequent Voter category also experienced a large 
increase in effect.  While the coefficient in the strategic experiment (2.88) appears to be smaller 
than the effect for the Infrequent Voter category, it still signifies a large increase from the non-
statistically significant results (-.21) in the non-strategic experiment.   
 An eyeball check of the results in Table 6-2 appears to support my hypothesis (H1) that 
exposure to the mobilization treatment is associated with a greater propensity to turnout among 
citizens who do not vote regularly or vote intermittently.  Interestingly, however, Frequent 
Voters also experienced an effect from the mobilization messages.  I will discuss these findings 
in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter.  Prior to rejecting the null, however, I first need 
to test for a difference in effect between each of the propensities to vote.  Replicating the steps 
taken in chapter 5 to test the effect between the two experimental groups, I tested for a difference 
in effects between the three propensities to vote .  The results indicated there was no statistical 
difference in effects.  Thus, mobilization messages delivered to strategically targeted households 
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has an effect for infrequent, intermittent and frequent voters in a down ballot low salience 
election.   
The effect of the treatment on infrequent voters does provide support for my theoretical 
argument that infrequent voters residing at households that would normally be contacted by a 
political campaign can in fact be reached by mobilization messages.  Folded back into the RAS 
model framework, when an infrequent voter who is likely to receive a mobilization message is 
contacted, they have an increased probability to accept the message, and then adjust their voting 
behavior (sample).  Thus, it appears infrequent voters are receptive to mobilization messages. 
Interestingly, all three theories on who is most responsive to mobilization messages are partially 
supported from the results of this study.  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) anticipated it was the 
least informed and politically engaged segments of the population who would be responsive.  
Within the strategic sample, infrequent voters did experience an increase in the probability of 
turning out to vote when they received the mobilization messages.  Hillygus (2005) posited it 
would be the most engaged and politically active segments of the population who would respond 
to mobilization messages.  The results of this study demonstrate that frequent voters did 
experience an effect from receiving the mobilization message.  Finally, Niven (2001, 2004) 
argued that individuals in the mid-range of political involvement and interest would be 
responsive to mobilization messages.  The results above indicate intermittent voters do respond 
to mobilization messages. 
Taken together, when a mobilization study includes strategy, it can be observed 
individuals with varying voter propensities will respond positively to mobilization messages in a 
down ballot campaign.  Unlike in prior studies, which anticipated the effect would be 
experienced by only one of the three groups, my findings indicate infrequent, intermittent and 
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frequent voters all respond to mobilization messages.   Again, these results are realized when 
applying the RAS model to the study of mobilization.  Identifying who is likely to receive the 
mobilization message is a necessary step in identifying who in the electorate is responsive to 
mobilization messages. 
 
6.7 DISCUSSION 
 
The findings in this chapter draw into question the assumption that mobilization messages are 
ineffective at mobilization politically disinterested segments of the population.  Once strategic 
targeting, consistent with the steps employed by campaign practitioners, is accounted for, it can 
be observed infrequent voters do in fact respond.  That conclusion, however, does come with 
some qualifications.   
First, not every infrequent voter responds the same way to mobilization messages.  This 
study opens the discussion about the influence of family members and roommates on the 
propensity to vote (see also Nickerson 2008).  If true, these results indicate infrequent voters 
living with a frequent voter are more responsive to mobilization messages than are infrequent 
voters living with other infrequent voters.  Future studies can test other modes of mobilization to 
see if the pattern of effect is consistent across other mobilization methods.  This study only 
utilized a door hanger experiment.  Replicating this study with phone calls, direct mail or door-
to-door canvassing will help contribute to this discussion. 
Second, once strategic targeting has been included in a study, I find infrequent voters are 
just as responsive to mobilization messages as are frequent voters.  If Arceneaux and 
Nickerson’s (2009) campaign salience condition was applied to the present study, we would 
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expect only frequent voters would be responsive to the door-to-door mobilization efforts.  
Arceneaux and Nickerson’s model posited that during low salience races, only the most 
politically engaged segment of the population will be responsive to mobilization messages.  By 
any metric, the campaign used for this study would be classified as a low salience election.  The 
top of the ticket was a primary election for County Executive, and the Magisterial Judicial race 
was at the bottom of the ticket.  
 Finally, the findings of this study must be couched as a case study.  Even though the 
judicial district used for this study is demographically similar to other districts in other states, I 
must be cautious about how much I generalize these results.  Replicating this study in a rural 
setting or suburban setting may yield different results.   
 Building on the findings in chapter 5, and this chapter, in the next chapter I explore the 
effects of mobilization messages on vote choice. 
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7.0 MOBILIZATION MESSAGE EFFECTS: VOTE CHOICE 
 
The study of mobilization has primarily focused on the effects of mobilization messages on the 
probability an individual will turn out on Election Day.  Turnout, however, is only one piece of 
the mobilization puzzle.  As I stated in the prior chapters, aggregate increases in turnout are not a 
priority for political campaigns.  Instead, it is the goal of practitioners to increase the turnout of 
individuals who support their candidate.  Arguably, if a mobilization drive increased aggregate 
turnout but resulted in a loss for the campaign conducting the mobilization efforts, it is doubtful 
they would consider the mobilization drive a success.  As such, the important missing element in 
the study of mobilization is the effect mobilization messages have on vote choice.  
 In this chapter I set out to capture the effect a last minute mobilization drive has on the 
vote share for a down ballot campaign.  Folding the discussion into the broader campaign effects 
literature, I find that a literature drop two days prior to Election Day can increase the vote share 
of a candidate in a four-way primary by as much as twenty five percent.  With the neutralization 
of the key heuristic (Party Identification) in a primary election, and the limited media coverage 
of down-ballot campaigns, mobilization messages appear to have a significant effect on vote 
choice as well as turnout rates. 
 
7.1 VOTE CHOICE: RECEIVE-ACCEPT-SAMPLE (RAS) MODEL 
 
The knowledge we have gained about the effects of campaigns on vote choice centers heavily on 
U.S. presidential campaigns and Congressional contests, but little is known about down ballot 
low salience campaign effects.  As I have outlined in the prior chapters, the renaissance of field 
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experiments in mobilization studies has contributed to our understanding of the effects of 
mobilization messages on turnout. By applying John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) 
model to the study of mobilization, however, it may guide our expectations regarding the effects 
of mobilization messages on vote choice in a down ballot campaign. 
In chapter 5 I focused on the receive step of the RAS model.  By understanding who in 
the electorate is likely to receive mobilization messages, it is possible to design a more realistic 
mobilization study to capture the effects of those messages.  In chapter 6 I focused on the accept 
and sample stages of the RAS model.  Once I identified who in the electorate was most likely to 
receive a mobilization message, I was then able to concentrate on identifying who, within that 
population of likely recipients, is responsive to those messages.  Once a message has been 
received, the recipient contemplates the information and decides whether to accept the new 
information.  Once accepted, the measure of the sampling of that information, within the 
mobilization application of the RAS model, is the change in behavior that information causes.  In 
chapter 6, the measured behavior was the probability of an individual to turn out to vote.  An 
increase in the probability to turn out is an indication the received information was accepted and 
then sampled when making the decision to cast a ballot on Election Day. Turnout, however, is 
not the only voting behavior that can be measured to capture the effect of mobilization messages.  
Accepting a received mobilization message can be sampled when an individual contemplates for 
which candidates to vote.  As such, this chapter focuses on the effects of mobilization messages 
on vote choice.  To facilitate my analysis, I start by providing a brief overview of campaign 
effects research that is applicable to the vote choice process. 
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7.2 CAMPAIGN EFFECTS 
 
The study of campaign effects can best be summarized by the changes over time in the way 
campaign effects have been defined.  The earliest studies of campaign effects focused on the 
ability of a message to convert the voting intentions of individuals.  Those studies, which found 
few if any people experienced such a drastic conversion, concluded that most people did not 
change their mind over the course of a campaign, and instead relied heavily on their 
predispositions of partisan attachments and policy attitudes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 
1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944).  Scholars concluded that campaigns have minimal 
effects on voters. 
 Subsequent studies provided theoretical support for the minimal effects conclusion, 
arguing campaigns are little more than political noise that signify nothing of substance 
(Holbrook 1996; Iyengar 2001; Shaw 1999).  Furthering that argument in the U.S. presidential 
campaign setting, it was concluded that campaigns have only a small net effect because the 
candidates are balanced in both skills and money.  As such, for every move one candidate makes 
the opposition has a counter move, thus neutralizing each other and resulting in an aggregate 
effect of zero (Finkel 1993).  The challenge with that conclusion, however, is its applicability (or 
lack of) to other political contests.  As with many of the theoretical conclusions drawn about 
campaign effects, the minimal effects thesis is derived from studying high salience elections.  
The low information and low salience nature of down ballot local campaigns, which comprise 
the vast majority of campaigns in the United States, may not fit well into the minimal effects 
theory.  As I will discuss later, the absence of countervailing information in a campaign can help 
facilitate the measurement of campaign effects.  If the assumption is that both sides are equally 
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matched, and thus are unable to gain much momentum, it seems logical to study campaign 
effects in a setting where candidates are not necessarily equally matched in skills and resources 
(Iyengar and Simon 2000).  
 The focus on “conversion” as a measure of campaign effects has long been questioned as 
a valid measure.  Instead, scholars have looked at more indirect campaign effects like learning, 
campaign priming, and persuasion.  As my earlier chapters focused on mobilization, I shift my 
attention to the effects of mobilization messages on vote choice.  To that end, I look at the 
literature on campaign effects focusing on the role of learning, priming, and voter persuasion; all 
factors that have been found to contribute to vote choice. 
 
7.3 LEARNING 
 
At the basic core of a campaign is the effort to inform voters about a particular candidate or an 
issue.  The goal, naturally, is to persuade voters to support (or oppose) the candidate or issue. But 
from a learning perspective, campaigns facilitate the learning process by providing the electorate 
with information germane to a particular election.  Campaign learning has been shown to directly 
shape how voters make their vote choice (Popkin 1991).  Thus, an understanding of how voters 
learn during a campaign is central to the current project. 
 From a behavioral perspective, not all voters are created equal.  Voters vary in their 
political sophistication and in their propensities to vote.  As such, it is difficult to measure which 
mode of campaigning is best at informing the general public.  Most of the factors identified as 
key to the learning process in a campaign are centered heavily on campaign activities in high 
salience elections.  Presidential debates (Chaffee 1978; Holbrook 1999), television advertising 
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(Johnson, Hagen and Jamieson 2004; Ridout et al. 2004), and news coverage (Johnson et al. 
2004) are campaign staples in well-funded high profile contests.  The further down the ballot you 
go, the smaller the campaign budget and often the less newsworthy the office.  For that reason, 
the theoretical underpinnings that guide our understanding of the learning process in campaigns 
are limited to the top of the ticket campaigns.    
 Further complicating the study of learning in a campaign is the consistent conclusion that 
average voters are cognitive misers.  For that reason, voters often rely on long-term 
characteristics like party identification, group identity, and retrospective evaluations (Campbell 
et al. 1960).  Those characteristics can prove useful in high salience races, but provide little 
guidance in a down ballot election or a primary election when all the candidates share the same 
basic characteristics.  
 Studies that have explored the learning process outside of presidential campaigns also 
provide little guidance for down-ballot low salience elections.  Focusing on Gubernatorial races 
(Carsey 2000), U.S. Senate races (Kahn and Kenney 1999), and U.S. House races (Jacobson 
1983), while less salient than a presidential contest, arguably are not low salience affairs.  As 
such, little is known about the learning process in campaigns that do not rely on televised news 
reports, commercials or debates.  This study is breaking new ground in the study of campaign 
learning and its effect on vote choice.  The information sharing process in this study, as I will 
explain in more detail later, focuses on retail politics, or what I call doorstep politics. 
 
7.4 PRIMING 
Not only do campaigns facilitate the information sharing process needed for citizen learning, 
they also help guide voters as to which issues and traits should be used when evaluating each 
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campaign.  Thus, campaigns prime the electorate to value certain issues and traits over others 
(Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  Naturally, a campaign will attempt to frame an issue in the most 
favorable way to benefit their candidate, but by simply elevating an issue in the minds of the 
electorate, regardless of the frame, a campaign can shape the standards by which a candidate is 
evaluated (Druckman 2004; Johnston et al. 1992).  If this is true in high salience races like 
presidential campaigns, it can be deduced the effect is also present in a race where voters have 
limited information about the candidates or even less information about the function and 
responsibilities of a down-ballot office.   
 One aspect of priming that has received a lot of attention is its ability to activate partisan 
attachments (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; McClurg and Holbrook 2005).  The belief 
is that by priming voters to think about partisanship, the campaign is encouraging fellow 
partisans to remember why they are affiliated with the political party (e.g., Finkel 1993).  In the 
context of a primary election, when all the candidates on the ballot are of the same party , the 
activation of partisan attachments provides voters with little assistance when making a voting 
decision.  As such, for priming to be useful in the decision making process, we need to identify 
which primes might have the most effect in down-ballot elections and primary contests.  For that 
I return to John Zaller’s RAS model (1992) and his study of the frequency and recency of 
exposure to mobilization messages. 
 The process by which primes work is by making information more accessible in the 
memory (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002).  Thus, exposure to 
the prime brings that information to the ”top of the head” when making decisions (Zaller 1992).  
Key to this assumption is the reception of the message.  If a voter is able to opt out of exposure, 
which is often the case with messages delivered via the television, then the message can have no 
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effect.  If the message is delivered to the front door of a voter’s residence, however, the ability to 
avoid exposure to the message is greatly reduced.  To that end, frames delivered via doorstep 
politics have a higher probability of being received than do frames delivered via the television. 
 
7.5 PERSUASION 
 
Ultimately, it comes down to the persuasiveness of the information learned or primed.  For the 
purpose of this project, I define persuasion as any campaign induced changes in the attitudes or 
considerations that underlie the vote decision (Hillygus 2010).  Within the RAS model, this 
would be the sample stage.  The learning and priming effects of campaign messages would 
represent the receive and accept staged of the RAS model.   
It is not necessary for a campaign to manipulate a voter or change her underlying 
predispositions for it to influence her vote choice.  In the case of partisan activation, a campaign 
is simply reminding a voter about her partisan ties.  For a low information down ballot campaign, 
simply providing information about the candidate or political office can facilitate the learning 
process, and thus affect the information used to make a vote decision.  It is the learning and 
priming processes of a campaign that has been identified as the mechanism by which individuals 
may change their vote choice (Hillygus and Shields 2008).  In other words, campaigns persuade 
voters by facilitating the learning process and priming them to value certain issues or candidate 
traits. 
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7.6 BRIDGING TURNOUT PERSUASION WITH VOTE CHOICE PERSUASION 
 
We are still a long way from fully understanding who is persuadable and under what conditions 
persuasion has the largest effect (Hillygus 2010).  We can, however, build on what we do know 
about persuasion, specifically how it relates to mobilization messages and turnout, to gain a 
better understanding of the persuasiveness of mobilization messages on vote choice.  Prior 
studies, including the chapters in the current project, have identified the persuasive power of 
mobilization messages to increase the probability an individual will cast a vote on Election Day.  
We now need to bridge what we know about turnout with the potential persuasive effects of 
mobilization messages on vote choice.  Utilizing the definition of persuasion outlined above, we 
can now chart a path for testing the effectiveness of mobilization messages to inform and prime 
voters in a down ballot campaign, resulting in a change in the criteria (sample) for making their 
voting decision.   
 From a simple logic perspective, it seems improbable that a mobilization message can 
have an effect on the probability of turning out to vote but have no effect on the voting decision 
process.  While it could be argued that voters in high salience races make up their mind well in 
advance of Election Day, and thus a mobilization message is simply a reminder to go vote, for 
down ballot contests, voters often lack the needed information to make a decision.  In these low 
salience campaigns, a mobilization message not only is a reminder to vote, but also serves as a 
learning and priming opportunity for a voter.  In Zaller’s RAS model (1992), the first assumption 
for a message to have an effect is that it is received.  Once received, the repetition of the 
message, and more importantly for the present study, the recency of the message elevates the 
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information to the “top of the head.”  Due to the low salience nature of a down ballot campaign, 
campaign messages often go unchallenged.   
 Due to the lack of ability to identify which candidate an individual citizen voted for, I am 
limited in what I can deduce about the voting decision behavior of individual voters based on 
their political sophistication.  In my earlier chapters, I was able to analyze voters with different 
voting propensities based on their exposure to the treatment and subsequent increase in the 
probability of turning out to vote.  Once they walk into the voting booth, however, my data at the 
individual level ends because there are no public records indicating who each citizen voted for.  
Therefore I am unable to directly identify who in the electorate is most persuadable by 
mobilization messages when making their voting decision.  I can, however, use aggregate vote 
share results and randomization and treatment strategies to isolate the effects of mobilization 
messages on vote choice.  Later in this chapter I will explain those steps in detail. Prior to that, 
however, I will use what is known about the effects of heterogeneity in campaign messages to 
guide this project. 
 Clearly, if different voters are receiving different campaign messages, it becomes more 
complicated to estimate the effect of each message.  This is largely the reason some have 
characterized campaigns as a cacophony of noise that makes little difference in the voting 
decisions of voters (e.g., Finkel 1993).  This is especially true in high salience races that inundate 
voters with multiple messages.  For down ballot campaigns, however, where money and 
volunteer time are scarce resources, there are situations when a candidate is only able to reach a 
voter once during an election cycle (e.g. Grey 2007; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Issenberg 
2012).   This is especially true when a campaign relies on a doorstep politics strategy for 
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contacting voters.  As such, that contact may be the only opportunity a voter has to receive 
information about that candidate, or even the position for which the candidate is running.   
 Returning to the recency effect of the RAS model, information received closer to Election 
Day is easier for a voter to retrieve when they go to their polling location (Zaller 1992).  When 
the information received is related to a low salience race, one for which a voter has limited 
information, that recent information may be the only information available when making a 
voting decision.  If voters rely heavily on shortcuts in high salience races, it shouldn’t be too 
much of a stretch to anticipate this same phenomenon taking place in a down ballot race.  In the 
absence of traditional heuristics like partisanship, voters are relegated to less precise shortcuts 
(Iyengar and Simon 2000).  The recognition of a name on a ballot sometimes is all that is needed 
for a voter to make a voting decision.  After all, voters are reluctant to vote for an unfamiliar 
name (Shaw 2011). 
 
7.7 HYPOTHESES 
 
Considering what has been established about the persuasive effects mobilization messages have 
on the probability to turnout to vote, coupled with the learning and priming effects of campaign 
messages and the subsequent effect they have on the vote decision process, I am ready to offer 
my hypothesis.  The purpose of this chapter is to capture the effect mobilization messages have 
on vote choice.  Given the low information nature of down ballot campaigns, and the propensity 
of voters to seek shortcuts when making a voting decision, I anticipate a mobilization message 
delivered in close proximity to Election Day will provide a voter with the “top of the head” 
information needed to make a vote choice.  Thus, a registered voter who receives a mobilization 
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door hanger from a campaign, which prior studies have shown to increase the probability of 
turning out by 1-3%, will have a higher probability of voting for the candidate (campaign) who 
delivered the door hanger compared to a registered voter who does not receive a door hanger.  
Formally stated: 
 
H1: Exposure to the mobilization treatment is associated with a greater propensity to vote 
for the candidate named in the mobilization treatment. 
 
7.8 TESTING THE VOTE CHOICE EFFECT 
 
Returning to the second door hanger experiment in chapters 5 and 6, I utilize the 19 voting 
districts (10 treatment and 9 control districts times 2 political parties results in an N=38) to test 
the effects of mobilization messages on vote choice.   For that field experiment, all households 
where a registered Republican or registered Democrat resided who had voted at least once prior 
to the election under consideration for this study were selected.  Consistent with the steps taken 
by campaign practitioners, and as outlined by Arceneaux (2005), the randomization for this 
experiment was conducted at the voting district level.  Randomizing an entire voting population 
is both impractical and inefficient.   The amount of distance a canvasser must cover to distribute 
a mobilization message becomes onerous when randomizing an entire voting population.  As 
such, randomizing by voting district allows a campaign to saturate an area, thus reducing the 
distance between houses to contact.  It also enables the testing of the effect of the treatment on 
vote share in the treatment districts.  
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Using the voting districts for the second door hanger experiment, I calculated the vote 
shares of each of the candidates in the Democratic Primary (4 candidates) and the Republican 
Primary (3 Candidates).  As I pointed out earlier, the state of Pennsylvania allows candidates 
running for Magisterial District Judge to cross-file, or have their name appear on both the 
Democratic and Republican primary ballots.  The candidate in the campaign used to collect the 
data for this project was cross-filed.  As such, I analyze the results for both primary elections. 
 In the following section, I discuss the results from regressing the treatment (Door 
Hanger) on Democratic and GOP vote share.  
 For my first model, I regressed the treatment on vote share, controlling for party ID and 
vote roll-off, and clustered on each voting district. The reason I am clustering on voting district 
is because two separate elections took place in each voting district.  Thus, my unit of analysis is 
each election (N=38) within each voting district (19).   
The challenge with clustering on voting district is I am inviting serial heteroskedasticity.  
Regression analysis using heteroscedastic data will still provide an unbiased estimate for the 
relationship between the predictor variable and the outcome, but standard errors and therefore 
inferences obtained from data analysis are suspect. Biased standard errors lead to biased 
inference, so results of hypothesis tests are possibly wrong.  As such, I used the Huber-White 
method (Huber 1967; Primo, Jacobsmeier and Milyo 2007; White 1980) of clustering standard 
errors by the source of the heteroskedasticity (voting district) to adjust the estimates of the 
standard errors to account for non-independence. 
 The inclusion of a control for PID is to capture any effect associated with voters in each 
election.  Because the primary elections were conducted as closed primaries, and individuals 
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self-select into a political party, there may be systematic differences between Democratic and 
GOP voters.   
 Finally, the control for vote roll-off is included to account for any effect associated with 
the drop in the number of individuals who vote on Election Day, but fail to register a vote in 
down ballot elections.  Because the campaign used for this project was the last elective office on 
the ballot, there is the potential for a vote roll-off effect in that race .  As I discussed in chapter 4, 
the use of electronic voting machines greatly reduces the presence of vote roll-off.  I include it as 
a control in an attempt to account for any effect it may have on vote choice. Vote roll-off is 
reported as a percentage capturing the difference between the total number of votes cast in a 
voting district for the top of the ticket contest compared to the total number of votes cast for the 
down ballot election used to collect data for this study. 
 
7.9 RESULTS 
 
Table 7-1 displays the results from regressing the treatment on vote share for the candidate in 
this study. 
 
TABLE	  7-­‐1	  
Regression	  of	  Door	  Hanger	  on	  Vote	  Share	  
	   	  	  	  	  b	   Robust	  Standard	  Errors	  
Received	  Door	  Hanger	   	  	  	  	  18.360	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.913***	  
PID	   	  	  	  -­‐30.012	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.972***	  
Vote	  Roll-­‐Off	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.250	   0.411	  
_cons	   	  	  	  	  	  49.979	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.101***	  
Note:	  ***p<.001	  	  
N=38	  
R2=0.733	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The regression coefficient for voters who received a door hanger is statistically 
significant and indicates the campaign conducting the leaflet drop experienced more than an 18 
percent (18.36) increase in vote share.  Those results appear to support H1, and indicate a leaflet 
drop conducted two days prior to Election Day in a down ballot campaign can positively increase 
vote share for the candidate who conducts a mobilization drive. 
Party ID is also significant and indicates the effect of the treatment on Democratic voters 
is larger than the effect on GOP voters.  Consistent with the literature on electronic voting 
machines and their effect on vote roll-off, vote roll-off is not statistically significant. 
Because Party ID is statistically significant, I reran my regression analyses for Democratic and 
GOP voters, respectively.   By separating Democratic and GOP voters into two separate models, 
I am halving my N, and thus ending up with a smaller sample size than I would like.   As such, 
these results should be viewed as a first step.  Future studies will need to replicate this study with 
a larger N.   There is value, however, in testing the same hypothesis twice in an effort to capture 
the relative generalizeability of my findings. 
Table 7-2 displays the results from regressing the treatment on Democratic vote share for 
the candidate in this study.   
 
TABLE	  7-­‐2	  
Regression	  of	  Door	  Hanger	  on	  Democratic	  Vote	  Share	  
	   	  	  	  	  b	   Standard	  Errors	  
Received	  Door	  Hanger	   	  	  	  	  	  25.473	   	  	  6.340**	  
-­‐cons	   	  	  	  	  	  48.016	   	  	  4.600**	  
Note:	  **p<.001	  	  
N=19	  
Adj	  R2=0.457	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The regression coefficient for Democratic voters who received a door hanger is 
statistically significant and indicates the campaign conducting the leaflet drop experienced more 
than a 25 percent (25.47) increase in vote share.  Those results support H1, and indicate a leaflet 
drop conducted two days prior to Election Day in a down ballot campaign can positively increase 
vote share for the candidate who conducts a mobilization drive. 
Table 7-3 displays the results from regressing the treatment on Republican vote share for 
the candidate in this study.   
 
TABLE	  7-­‐3	  
Regression	  of	  Door	  Hanger	  on	  GOP	  Vote	  Share	  
	   	  	  	  	  b	   Standard	  Errors	  
Received	  Door	  Hanger	   	  	  	  	  	  10.356	   3.109*	  
-­‐cons	   	  	  	  	  	  24.255	   	  	  2.255**	  
Note:	  **p<.001	  and	  *p<.01	  
N=19	  
Adj	  R2=0.359	  
 
Once again, the regression coefficient for Republican voters who received a door hanger 
is statistically significant and indicates the campaign conducting the leaflet drop experienced 
more than a 10 percent (10.36) increase in vote share.  Those results also appear to support H1, 
and indicates a leaflet drop conducted two days prior to Election Day in a down ballot campaign 
can positively increase vote share for the candidate who conducts a mobilization drive.   
There appears to be a difference in the effect between Democrats and Republicans.  To 
test the difference between the increases in vote share, I followed the steps outlined by Garfield 
(1984) to compare regression coefficients between two groups.  I can compare the regression 
coefficients of Vote Share for Democrats with Republicans to test the null hypothesis Ho: Bgop 
= Bdem, where Bgop is the regression coefficient for Republicans, and Bdem is the regression 
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coefficient for Democrats.  Table 7-4 displays the results from regressing the treatment, party ID 
and the interaction term on vote share. 
 
TABLE	  7-­‐4	  
Testing	  the	  Difference	  Between	  the	  Increase	  in	  Democratic	  and	  GOP	  Vote	  Share	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  b	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  t	   Standard	  Errors	  
Received	  Door	  Hanger	  
Democratic	  Contest	  
Treatment*Democrat	  
	  25.47	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.10	  
-­‐23.22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐4.53	  
-­‐15.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐2.14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  4.993***	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.123***	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7.062*	  
-­‐cons	   	  48.02	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.25	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.623***	  
Note:	  ***p<.001,	  **p<.01	  and	  *p<.05	  
N=38	  
Adj	  R2=0.7404	  
 
Interpreting the results, the Interaction Term tests the null hypothesis Ho: Bgop = Bdem. 
It is the t value, not the coefficient, which is used to assess the significance between two groups.  
The t value for the interaction term is -2.14 and is significant at the 95-percent confident interval, 
indicating that the regression coefficient Bdem is significantly different from Bgop.  This 
indicates the increase in vote share for the Democratic treatment group and the increase in vote 
share for the Republican treatment group are statistically different.  Thus, the increase in vote 
share for the candidate in the four-way Democratic primary is not the same increase in vote share 
the candidate received in the three-way Republican primary. 
 All I can do is speculate about why the difference in effect was observed.  The first is to 
look at the self-selection process when an individual chooses a political party.  There are likely 
systematic differences between those who select the Democratic Party with those who choose to 
be Republicans.  That systematic difference may affect the effect of mobilization messages.  
Second, due to the partisan makeup of the judicial district, and the fact GOP candidates have 
historically not performed well at the polls, Republicans may feel like they live in “enemy 
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territory” and are less likely to vote (Gimpel, Dyck and Shaw 2004).   Future studies can explore 
the reasons for the difference in observed outcomes.  It appears, however, a last minute door 
hanger get-out-the-vote push has a larger effect on vote choice for Democratic voters than it does 
for Republicans. 
 
7.10 DISCUSSION 
 
The findings of this study indicate a last minute mobilization drive can have significant effects 
on the vote share for a candidate conducting the drive.  These results appear to support the 
argument that mobilization messages can affect electoral outcomes.  If a candidate is able to 
boost his/her vote share by double digit percentages in a down ballot primary election, it appears 
mobilization messages have a larger effect on vote choice than they do on turnout.  If you 
consider the data from chapter 5 indicates the last minute literature drop used for this chapter 
netted an aggregate increase of turnout by roughly 5.1%, the net gain in vote share easily eclipses 
the boost in turnout.  I need to put those results in context, however. 
A 25% increase in vote share does not mean a candidate who had 26% of the vote share 
in an election can expect to raise their vote share to 51%.  Measuring an increase in vote share is 
a measure of the percentage increase of an individual candidate’s votes.  Thus, if a candidate 
received 4 votes in a control voting district, but in the treatment district received 5 votes, the 
result is a 25% increase in vote share for that candidate.  If their opponent had 30 votes, the 
difference of that one vote increase (a 25% jump in vote share) would not make a difference in 
the outcome of the election.  If the two candidates were closely matched, however, a 25% 
increase in vote share can make a difference.  Due to the low salience nature of the campaign, 
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and the relative low number of votes for each of the 4 Democratic candidates in each voting 
district (3 GOP candidates), the percentage increase in vote share seems plausible.   
As this is the result of one mobilization field experiment in a single campaign, caution needs to 
be taken before we get too excited.  While the results do appear to support the value of 
mobilization messages on affecting the vote choice of voters, these results need to be replicated 
in other campaign settings before we can be confident in the outcome of this study.  Regardless, 
the results are promising. 
Future studies can test to see if a mobilization drive for other down ballot campaigns will 
result in comparable increases in vote share.  Additionally, because the election for this study 
was in an urban setting, replicating the field experiment in a suburban and/or rural setting is 
called for.   
Another aspect of a future study could directly test the recency effect of mobilization 
messages.  For this study, the literature drop took place two days prior to Election Day.  The 
underlying assumption, consistent with the RAS model of John Zaller (1992), is the close 
proximity to Election Day helps elevate the mobilization message to the “top of the head” of the 
voters who received a door hanger.  Implementing multiple literature drops on different days 
leading up to the election would provide an opportunity to test the limits of the recency effect.   
 The key take away point from this study is that mobilization messages affect more than 
just turnout.  In a low salience and low information contest, a last minute mobilization drive can 
provide voters with enough information to prompt them to change their consideration when 
making their voting decision.  This project has provided a first step at capturing the effect 
mobilization messages have on vote choice.  Again, future studies will be able to build on and 
refine these findings. 
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8.0 CONCLUSION 
 
I started this project by describing the puzzle presented to scholars who seek to identify who in 
the electorate respond to mobilization messages.  An exploration of the extant literature brought 
into focus the need for a coherent theoretical underpinning.  Not only were there conflicting 
theoretical expectations for who responds to mobilization messages, there was also reason to 
believe the conflict in theory had implications for the validity of prior mobilization study results.  
By applying John Zaller’s (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model to the study of 
mobilization message effects, I have offered a theoretical story that may resolve some of the 
prior theoretical inconsistencies. 
 The first step in bridging the RAS model from the study of media message effects to the 
study of mobilization message effects was to identify who in the electorate is most likely to 
receive mobilization messages.  As Zaller (1992) pointed out, if a media message is not received, 
it can’t have an effect.  Thus, understanding who, in the media message environment, was most 
likely to be exposed to the messages was central to his model.  Keeping in mind that an 
important aspect of a field study is to ensure the individuals included in a field experiment 
resemble the individuals who would normally come in contact with the stimuli of interest 
(Gerber, Green and Shachar 2010), it became apparent the receive step was also crucial for this 
project.  Without a realistic understanding of who is likely to receive a mobilization message, it 
is impossible to accurately identify who will respond to those messages.  As such, the first step 
in this dissertation was to gain a better understanding of who is likely to receive a mobilization 
message.  By reviewing political science voter behavior literature and campaign strategy guides 
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written for political practitioners, past voting history emerged as the primary contributor to the 
probability an individual will receive a mobilization message (e.g. Gerber, Green and Shachar 
2003; Grey 2007; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Issenberg 2012).  As such, in Chapter 5 I set out 
to test for the potential selection bias introduced in a mobilization study that includes individuals 
who would not normally receive a mobilization message. 
 
8.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGY WHEN STUDYING MOBILIZATION 
 
Not every registered voter has an equal probability of receiving a mobilization message.  
Operating on limited resources of time and money, campaigns strategically target voters when 
deciding who to contact.  As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, that has implications for the study of 
the effects of mobilization messages.  Individuals who would normally be ignored by a political 
campaign systematically respond differently to those messages when compared to individuals 
who would be strategically targeted.  As such, a study including individuals who would normally 
be ignored by a political campaign is likely introducing selection bias.  The inclusion of 
individuals who would not normally come in contact with mobilization messages distances a 
researcher from the phenomenon of interest and essentially waters down the effects of those 
mobilization messages.  By incorporating the strategic targeting methods used by political 
practitioners, and then randomizing treatment and control groups within that population, I was 
able to gain a more realistic picture of the effects of mobilization messages. 
`As I pointed out earlier, there is value in understanding the effects of mobilization 
messages if all registered voters were to be contacted.  That hypothetical scenario provides 
scholars with information needed to speculate about the effects of expanding mobilization efforts 
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to include individuals who would normally be ignored by a political campaign.  This project is 
not a criticism of that goal.  Instead, I was focused on gaining a better understanding of the 
effects of mobilization messages in the current political environment where practitioners 
strategically target likely voters when conducting a mobilization drive (Goldstein and Holleque 
2010).  We now have a more accurate picture of the effect of mobilization messages in an actual 
campaign setting. 
Aggregate increases in turnout are useful for capturing the effects of including 
individuals in a study who would normally be ignored by a political campaign.  Aggregate 
numbers, however, do not tell us who within the strategically targeted population respond to 
mobilization messages.  Thus, the receive step of the RAS model does not fully complete the 
mobilization puzzle.  To answer who is responsive to mobilization messages I turned my 
attention in Chapter 6 to the accept and sample stages of the RAS model. 
 
8.2 WHO MOBILIZES: MIXED RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In Zaller’s media message application of his RAS model, his measure for capturing the accept 
and sample stages of his model came in the form of measuring attitude and opinion change.  
After an individual received a media message, (s)he would consider the new information and 
decide whether to accept or reject it.  Once accepted, the individual then sampled that new 
information when updating their attitudes and opinions about a political issue.  Applying the 
RAS model to the study of mobilization message effects, the accept and sample stage is 
measured by capturing behavior change.  In Chapter 6 I set out to capture the effect of 
mobilization messages on individuals with different propensities to vote.  Thus, the measured 
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behavior was an increase in the probability an individuals who received a mobilization message, 
accepted the message and then sampled it, would turn out to vote.    
Using the nonstrategic sample selection methods used in prior mobilization studies (e.g. 
Niven 2001, 2004) as a baseline for comparison, I found, consistent with those prior studies, it 
was only individuals with intermittent voter propensities who responded to mobilization 
messages.  Once the strategic targeting methods used by political practitioners were 
incorporated, however, not only did intermittent voters respond, but so did infrequent and 
frequent voters.  Theoretically, I anticipated the effect for infrequent voters.  Admittedly, 
however, the effect for frequent voters was a surprise.  While I was surprised by the results, it is 
not totally inconsistent with the theoretical underpinning for this project.  
If you remember my discussion in Chapter 3 about the application of the RAS model to 
the study of mobilization messages, I explored the various forms of resistance identified by 
Zaller (1992) which potentially reduce the effectiveness of media messages.  Inertial Resistance 
takes into consideration the relative level of information the individual already possesses.  
Individuals who already have large stores of information will be better equipped to assess the 
value of a new message.  That repository of information functions as a barrier for new 
information to be accepted.  Individuals who have limited information, on the other hand, are 
more likely to accept the new message when compared to a highly informed individual.  Their 
limited information provides them with less ability to resist the new message.  It would be 
anticipated that a frequent voter has larger stores of information when compared to an infrequent 
voter.  Due to the low salience nature of the campaign used for this study, however, there may be 
reason to believe even frequent voters have limited information about down ballot campaigns.  
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Thus, in light of that limited information, it is not that big of a surprise frequent voters can also 
be reached by mobilization messages in a low salience election. 
 The finding that infrequent, intermittent and frequent voters respond to mobilization 
messages, once you control for selection bias, offers support for the theories that appeared to be 
at odds with each other.  Specifically, it was Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) who anticipated it 
was infrequent voters who are most responsive to mobilization messages, Hillygus (2005) who 
anticipated it was frequent voters, and Niven (2001, 2004) who concluded it was intermittent 
voters who were most responsive.  Through the lens of the RAS model, in a way, they each 
receive some support from my findings.  The discrepancy in conclusions of those earlier theories 
can be traced to the sample selection methods used.  The inclusion of strategy when studying the 
effects of mobilization messages provides a more accurate picture of who is mobilizeable. 
Interestingly, the one theory that appears to not be supported by my findings is 
Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009).  Their campaign salience model posits that the effect of 
mobilization messages is conditional on the salience of a given election.  Applying their model to 
the present study, I would anticipate only frequent voters to be responsive to mobilization 
messages.  By any metric, the magisterial judicial race used to collect the data for my dissertation 
would be classified as a low salience campaign.    According to Arceneaux and Nickerson, in 
low salient races, it is only voters with higher propensities to vote who will respond to 
mobilization messages.  Those in the middle will respond to mobilization messages when the 
salience of the race falls somewhere in the middle, like a mayoral race.  The only time infrequent 
voters will respond to mobilization messages is during the most salient elections, like a 
presidential campaign.  My results clearly contradict that conclusion.    
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8.3 MOBILIZATION: NOT JUST A TOOL FOR TURNOUT 
 
An increase in the probability of turning out to vote is not the only behavior that can potentially 
be affected by mobilization messages.  Once an individual receives the message, decides to 
accept it and then samples that message when making behavior decisions, it is possible that 
information can affect the criteria used to make a vote choice. As such, vote choice is an 
important piece of the mobilization puzzle. 
An aggregate increase in turnout will not be considered a success by a political campaign 
if the end result is a loss on Election Day: The goal of political practitioners is to win elections.  
The academic community also has interest in understanding the effects of mobilization messages 
on the vote choice process.  The findings of this dissertation contribute to the broader campaign 
effects literature.   
 In Chapter 7, I set out to capture the effect a last minute get-out-the-vote drive has on the 
vote share for a candidate who conducts the drive.  My findings indicate voters reward 
candidates handsomely for GOTV efforts.  While the aggregate turnout increase was consistent 
with prior findings, the bump in vote share was as high as 25% in a four-way primary.  
Considering the deciding vote margin in many elections is in the single digits, those findings 
lend support to the effect mobilization messages have on electoral outcomes.  Not only do they 
have an effect on aggregate turnout, but mobilization messages also can affect the vote share for 
the candidate employing the mobilization efforts.   
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8.4 FINAL THOUGHTS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Admittedly, the findings in this project need to be interpreted as a case study.  The judicial race 
used to collect the data for my field experiments is not representative of all political contests.  
Additionally, the off election year primary campaign provides a setting that is not replicated in 
every state or locality.  Many states hold their local elections in conjunction with federal and 
state-wide office seekers.  It does, however, provide insight into the potential effects of 
mobilization messages in other down ballot low salience elections.  A magisterial judicial 
election in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania arguably attracts roughly the same limited media coverage 
as a city auditor election in Barstow, California.  Thus, doorstep politics may provide voters in 
various localities and in different electoral settings the needed information to prompt them to not 
only cast a ballot on Election Day, but to also support the candidate conducting the mobilization 
drive.  The point is, while the results of this study may not apply to all elections, there are lessons 
to be learned in this project that can be applied to at least some of the roughly 300,000 elective 
offices in the United States. 
 Like any case study, replication of my field experiments is called for.  Not only should 
they be retested in a similar setting to confirm the results of my study, but they should also be 
expanded to include other elective offices in other electoral settings.  Only then will we be able 
to better understand the effects of mobilization messages on city council races or school board 
elections, or their effects in small to medium sized municipalities.  Population density, 
homogeneity of residents, and type of office may all affect the effect of mobilization messages.  
 In the end, the chapters in this dissertation provide compelling support for the effects 
mobilization messages have on turnout and vote choice.  Far from definitive, my findings 
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contribute to the body of literature on mobilization, and open the door for new directions of 
academic inquiry.  Mobilization messages appear to cut the information collection costs for 
voters in down ballot low salience campaigns.  By taking the campaign to the doorstep of voters, 
candidates increase the probability that a low propensity voter will be exposed to political 
messages.  That exposure, combined with living with a frequent voter, appears to have positive 
effects on turnout and vote share.  Future studies can explore the applicability these findings 
have in other political settings.   
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9.0 APPENDIX A 
RANDOMIZATION CHECK 
Table	  9-­‐1	  
Non-­‐Strategic	  Door	  Hangers	  
TREATMENT:	  Door	  Hanger	  Experiment	  Randomizing	  All	  Voter	  Eligible	  Population	  
	   Treatment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2010	  Vote	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Turnout	  %	  
Total	  
Republican	  
Democrat	  
	  	  	  	  3714	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2021	  
	  	  	  	  1010	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  554	  
	  	  	  	  2704	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1467	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54.42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54.85	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54.25	  
	  
 
Non-­‐Strategic	  Door	  Hangers	  
CONTROL:	  Door	  Hanger	  Experiment	  Randomizing	  All	  Voter	  Eligible	  Population	  
	   Control	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2010	  Vote	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Turnout	  %	  
Total	  
Republican	  
Democrat	  
	  	  14969	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8468	  
	  	  	  	  2529	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1277	  
	  	  12440	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7191	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56.57	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50.49	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57.81	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Table	  9-­‐2	  
Strategic	  Door	  Hangers	  
TREATMENT:	  Door	  Hanger	  Experiment	  Randomizing	  All	  Voter	  Eligible	  Population	  
	   Treatment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2010	  Vote	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Turnout	  %	  
Total	  
Republican	  
Democrat	  
	  	  	  	  3183	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1905	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  498	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  
	  	  	  	  2685	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1652	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59.85	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50.80	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61.53	  
	  
 
Strategic	  Door	  Hangers	  
CONTROL:	  Door	  Hanger	  Experiment	  Randomizing	  All	  Voter	  Eligible	  Population	  
	   Control	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2010	  Vote	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Turnout	  %	  
Total	  
Republican	  
Democrat	  
	  	  	  3831	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2407	  
	  	  	  	  	  515	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  314	  
	  	  	  3316	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2093	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62.83	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60.97	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63.12	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